The Individual Responsibility of Ministers

Finer, S. E.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1956.tb01499.x

Cited by 56 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…In the case of Great Britain, however, this connection is not confirmed empirically. Indeed, Finer (1956, pp. 393–4), Jordan and Richardson (1987, p. 142) and Marshall (1989b, p. 5) put the connection between ministerial responsibility and ministerial resignations into question.…”

Section: The Results In An International Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

‘…i Take Political Responsibility!’: The Theoretical and Empirical Relation Between Ministerial Responsibility and Ministerial Resignations in Germany

Fischer

2011

Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How is the doctrine of ministerial responsibility applied in the decisions of German ministers (not) to resign? This question arises from an empirical puzzle as well as from a theoretical contradiction. Despite the prominent principle of ministerial responsibility, empirically, the ‘personal consequences' of ministerial scandals in their area of responsibility, display a large variance. Some ministers resign because of rather trifling affairs, others stay in office in spite of serious scandals. Taking into consideration the delegation relationship between the executive and the parliament, in view of the principal‐agent theory, a minister's resignation due to major political or personal misconduct is to be expected. On the other hand, the actual constitutional configuration of ministerial responsibility casts theoretical doubts on the ministerial loss of office. The quantitative analysis of 133 resignation issues in the years 1949 to 2009 reveals that ministerial responsibility bears no relevance to the decision whether to resign or not. Indeed, when the cause of the resignation issue is directly connected to ministerial responsibility, the probability of a resignation even decreases.

show abstract

Section: The Results In An International Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, the explanation for the occurrence of resignations is not so prominent. Proceeding thus, this study takes a different perspective to that of classical resignation research, in particular that of researchers of British origin such as Finer (1956) and Dowding and Kang (1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘…i Take Political Responsibility!’: The Theoretical and Empirical Relation Between Ministerial Responsibility and Ministerial Resignations in Germany

Fischer

2011

Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…25 That being said, it is incorrect to cast the doctrine of ministerial responsibility as irrelevant to Westminster parliamentary government. Indeed, the paper's results should serve as a cautionary note to studies that use the small number of ministerial resignations for a departmental error as an argument for the nonexistence (and hence the emptiness) of the convention of ministerial responsibility (Finer;Woodhouse 1994). Resignation is not an equilibrium outcome of either the game with ministerial responsibility or the game without it; in the former, ministers take steps to eliminate departmental errors, in the latter they are not obliged to resign for these errors.…”

Section: Is the Bureaucracy Modeled Appropriately?mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…On the assumption of parties as unitary actors, see Laver and Schofield (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1995). On the intraparty politics of ministerial responsibility see Finer (1965), Marshall (1989, 127-133), and Woodhouse (1994, 47-161). 8.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Not Just Parliamentary ‘Cowboys and Indians’: Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

Kam

2000

Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a minister solely responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy.At the heart of Westminster parliamentary government is the constitutional doctrine of responsible government (Jones, 88; Sutherland). The doctrine has collective and individual aspects. The collective aspect of responsible government requires that ministers, as a group, bear responsibility for the policies and performance of their government. In practice this means that the government (i.e., the Ministry) must have the confidence of the House and that individual ministers must publicly support the Cabinet's decisions. Individual responsibility refers to the responsibility borne by a minister in his or her capacity as the political head of a government department. It is with individual responsibility that this paper is concerned.Individual responsibility requires that the minister be both accountable and responsible to Parliament for his or her department's activities (Woodhouse 1994, 27-39). The minister is accountable to Parliament in the sense that it is he or she to whom MPs put their questions and from whom they receive answers regarding the relevant department's policies and actions. In this capacity, the minister may simply be a conduit for information, or may be required to justify his or her department's position to Parliament. Responsibility goes beyond accountability; it requires that the minister not only explain his or her department's actions and policies but, in the event of a departmental error, accept the blame for the mistake and, if possible, correct

show abstract

“…Its condition was surely revealed as parlous as early as Finer (1956). But IMR, perhaps never a strong convention even in a simpler world of coherent Whitehall departments, is further weakened and strained by the development of agencies, decentralization, devolution and the marketization of public adminisaccount, for the policies, decisions and actions taken within their field of responsibility' (Chapter 1, Part 1 (b)).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Ministerial responsibility and the Scottish Qualifications Agency

Clarence¹

2002

Public Administration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Scottish Qualifications Agency (SQA) is charged with the task of overseeing school-based qualifications in Scotland. However, for the 2000 exam diet the SQA failed to produce either timely or accurate exam results. The events surrounding this failure, accompanied by the responsible minister's explanation of his own actions and inactions, brought to the fore issues of responsibility and accountability. The unresolved nature of accountability and responsibility within government, particularly in relation to non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), became apparent as the inquiries into the SQA took evidence. Utilizing the SQA as a powerful example, this article explores the problematic structures of accountability and responsibility that exist between NDPBs and ministers.

show abstract

The Individual Responsibility of Ministers

Cited by 56 publications

References 0 publications

‘…i Take Political Responsibility!’: The Theoretical and Empirical Relation Between Ministerial Responsibility and Ministerial Resignations in Germany

‘…i Take Political Responsibility!’: The Theoretical and Empirical Relation Between Ministerial Responsibility and Ministerial Resignations in Germany

Not Just Parliamentary ‘Cowboys and Indians’: Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

Ministerial responsibility and the Scottish Qualifications Agency

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About