The Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: The Dialectic of Lord and Bondsman in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

Abstract

The general idea summarily introduced here-that we are the sorts of beings we are with our characteristic "self-consciousness" only on account of the fact that we exist "for" each other or, more specifically, are recognized or acknowledged (anerkannt) by each other, an idea we might refer to as the "acknowledgment condition" for self-consciousness-constitutes one of Hegel's central claims in the Phenomenology. This is a substantial claim indeed, and is at the heart of the thesis of "the sociality of reason". 2 It is, however, introduced in a seemingly arbitrarily way in the paragraph prior to the "Independence and Dependence" section, and at the conclusion of a discussion examining "desire" as a model for self-consciousness. Exactly why we are meant to accept the acknowledgment condition is, to say the least, far from clear, and while even a cursory reading of the famous lord and bondsman "dialectic" that follows enables one to get the general picture, the philosophical significance we are meant to extract from it is not obvious. In Hegel's exploration of the nature and conditions of self-consciousness in these pages, much hangs on his use of the terms "being-in-itself", "being-for-itself", and "being-for-another", but as with so many of Hegel's characteristic expressions, while it is easy enough to get an

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“…This latter aspect is especially important from the point of view of our discourse, because it highlights a striking parallelism between the Hegelian concept of recognition and the recognitive practices exhibited by courts. As I reminded some lines above, he maintained that through recognition self-consciousnesses penetrate for the first time the Realm of Spirit, that is, enter into a sphere of life distinct from 28 See Redding (2008), p. 104. This first step is made possible because the recognition of the other as another subject exactly alike the first self-consciousness entails the opening of a supra-individual sphere, constituted through the negation of itself that each self-consciousness effects.…”

“…Actually the issue cannot be settled so quickly. For further details, seeSiep (1979) andRedding (2008).20 Hegel (1977) [1807], p. 111. See alsoKingsbury (2009).19 Among Hegel's predecessors it is impossible not to mention Fichte.…”

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“…Moreover, for Hegel, the purely naturalistic attitude is incompatible with freedom. It was often argued, that the subsequent movement of recognition, in which a person establishes itself as such and then an exemplary asymmetric relationship (that of lord and bondsman) emerges, lies at the heart of human sociality (Redding 2008). So the lesson one could draw is not that violence is the foundation of institutions (although the role of violence is extremely important, see North, Wallis, and Weingast 2007), but instead that only intersubjectivity leads one to transcend the limits of a purely physical, nature-guided point of view (see Enz., par.…”

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“…This goes back to the shared view that human sociality is essential to achieve a proper understanding of one's own self. Smith's general notion of the Spectator relates to Hegel's argument that the realization of one's own individuality and individual freedom is essentially dependent on the recognition by the other, as epitomized in the famous lord and bondsman dialectic (Redding 2008). This is based on the need to express oneself, which in turn is impossible without relying on the resources of sociality, such as language.…”