The Imprudence of the Vulnerable

Matthews, Steve

doi:10.1007/s10677-013-9482-8

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The ethics of blame requires that we take into account the justificatory conditions of these other aspects: failing to do so might risk redoubling any harm that might have already satisfied the deterrent purpose of blame or even reinforcing oppressive institutional norms, if blame is performed publicly (cf. Snow 1994; Matthews 2014; Engen 2020). 31 Until we take all of these into account, we cannot fully assess the justifiability of blaming even in cases like the blameworthy women of the Appeal.…”

Section: False Consciousness and Blameworthinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But there is an intuitive worry in general that appealing to the notion of false consciousness in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups amounts to victim-blaming by conceptual fiat (see, for example, Superson 1993; Cudd 2006; Hay 2013), 2 that is, where victim-blaming is understood to refer to blaming practices that focus attention inappropriately on victims in accounting for the relevant harms (Harvey 1999; cf. Matthews 2014). 3 This is because simply using the concept of false consciousness to characterize oppressed agents would, allegedly, not only detract attention from underlying unjust structural conditions but also unduly assume an otherwise absent or diminished moral agency.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Wilson

2021

Hypatia

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Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of reasoning or knowledge practices, undermining their status as responsible moral agents. But attending to the constitutive mechanisms and heterogeneity of false consciousness enables us to see how having it does not in itself render someone an inappropriate target of blame. I focus here on the 1889 antisuffragist manifesto “An Appeal against Female Suffrage,” arguing that its signatories, despite false consciousness, satisfy both conditions for ordinary blameworthiness. I consider three prominent signatories, observing that the irrationality characterization is unsustainable beyond group-level diagnoses, and that their capacity to respond appropriately to reasons was not compromised. Following recent work on epistemic injustice, I also argue that culpable mechanisms constituted their false consciousness, rendering them blameworthy for the Appeal.

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Section: False Consciousness and Blameworthinessmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Wilson

2021

Hypatia

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“Stay away from the Park”: A Case for Police-Issued Personal Safety Advice for Women

Minehan

2023

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Are police officers morally justified in issuing unsolicited personal safety advice to women? Such advice often attracts accusations of ‘victim blaming’, although prevention advice remains a common tool used by police to address many crime and safety risks. While some examples of police advice are clearly outrageous, this article considers whether there is a place for ‘sound’ advice, i.e., advice that is proportionate, easy to follow, empirically justified, and objectively likely to reduce harm. To explore this, the article proposes a thought experiment that compares safety advice dealing with threats to women from human sources with safety advice issued in response to natural phenomena, such as flooding. It argues that, despite apparent differences, safety advice addressing risks from humans and natural phenomena are relevantly similar. Consequently, if advice dealing with natural phenomena is morally justified then advice to women about human threats is also morally justifiable. Nevertheless, the article also considers whether the purported prevalence of sexism in policing may make safety advice for women morally problematic. While levels of sexism in policing may vary across time and location, it is argued that safety advice would be morally justified even if sexism was widespread among police officers. Finally, the article considers whether crime prevention advice may backfire by effectively curtailing women’s freedoms. Rather than curtailing freedom, however, it is argued that sound advice may actually enable women to flourish by helping them overcome fear of crime and achieve non-instrumental goals that they have set for themselves.

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The Imprudence of the Vulnerable

Cited by 2 publications

References 15 publications

Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Antisuffragists

“Stay away from the Park”: A Case for Police-Issued Personal Safety Advice for Women

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