In his 1910 poem, 'Lines to a Don', Hilaire Belloc takes a triumphant and hilarious charge at an unnamed academic, whose writing he characterises as 'Unworthy for a tilt with men'. The kind of peevishness that Belloc describes unfortunately can sometimes raise its head within debates about what properly constitutes 'legal philosophy' and, even more divisively, how we should design our Jurisprudence syllabuses. These often-acrimonious disagreements, at least as they appear online, now tend to turn on questions of decolonisation and inclusiveness. The most recent round of disquiet arose after Professor Stephen Sachs of Harvard Law School released his complete Jurisprudence syllabus online. 2 That syllabus named only two women, one of which is a faculty assistant. 3 The resulting and perhaps inevitable backlash swiftly expanded into a general discussion on the value of diverse and inclusive set readings within Jurisprudence. 4 I was amongst one of Sachs' most vocal critics and, since I was not as clear online as I might otherwise have been, my aim in this short paper is to develop my points more fully.Another vocal contributor was Professor Brian Leiter of Chicago Law School, who accused several detractors of not understanding the scholarship listed on Sachs' syllabus and (apparently by extension) the subject of Jurisprudence itself. 5 I do not consider this to be a particularly fair critique for several reasons. Nevertheless, I intend to take Leiter's underlying point seriously. In what follows, I ask whether denying the centrality of authors such as HLA Hart, Ronald Dworkin, or Joseph Raz to the study of 'the nature of law and legal obligation, the relationship between law and morals, and the