The importance of disclosure in corporate governance self-regulation across Europe: A review of the Winter Report and the EU Action Plan

Maassen, Gregory; Bosch, Frans van den; Volberda, Henk

doi:10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040020

Cited by 22 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Third, an important issue is the concept of independent directors. Although most corporate governance codes underscore the independence of boards of directors, Maassen et al (2004) question whether independent directors are truly independent enough to be effective monitors. This is particularly the case because the definition of director independence varies across countries and even firms.…”

Section: Firm-level: Compliance and Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Codes of Good Governance

Aguilera¹,

Cuervo-Cazurra²

2009

Corporate Governance

377

220

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Manuscript Type: ReviewResearch Question/Issue: We review the recent developments in the area of codes of good governance, a set of best practice recommendations regarding the behavior and structure of the board of directors. Research Findings/Results: Our review of the literature on codes of good governance highlights their rapid spread around the world and how academic research has lagged behind in analyzing this topic. Despite the criticism that the codes' voluntary nature limits their ability to improve governance practices, codes of good governance appear to have generally improved the governance of countries that have adopted them, although there is need for additional reforms. Theoretical Implications: Unfortunately, research on codes of good governance has developed in insolation with little cross-fertilization across the different disciplines. We propose a multi-level framework to discuss three main topics that have emerged within the codes literature: the motivations behind the diffusion of codes across countries and its implications for convergence of corporate governance practices; the content of the codes and their "comply or explain" dimension; and the relationship between code compliance and firm performance. We conclude by proposing four areas of future research. Practitical Implications: Code development, adoption, and compliance are directly related to issues surrounding the governance of the firm, and in particular to all the interactions that a director has inside and outside the firm. Codes are regulations that emerge from policy-making negotiations between multiple stakeholders, such as the state (via the stock market regulators) and the investors.

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Section: Firm-level: Compliance and Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Codes of Good Governance

Aguilera¹,

Cuervo-Cazurra²

2009

Corporate Governance

377

220

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Although the first corporate governance code was introduced at the end of the 1970s in the United States (Salacuse and Braker, 2002), especially the publication in 1992 of the “Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance” (better known as the Cadbury report; Cadbury Committee, 1992) created a worldwide flood of self‐regulatory initiatives to establish corporate governance codes. At the beginning of 2005, some 50 countries had introduced one or more corporate governance codes (Cromme, 2005; Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2004; Maassen et al , 2004).…”

Section: Corporate Governance Codes: a Review Of Recent Developmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004

Akkermans

Ees

Hermes

et al. 2007

Corporate Governance

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This article examines the overall acceptance of the best practice provisions contained in the Dutch corporate governance code and identifies those that receive comparably less agreement among 150 Dutch listed companies in 2004. The findings indicate a high level of compliance with the Code. Moreover, the extent of compliance is positively associated with company size. Provisions related to the remuneration of board members, independence of supervisory board members, and requirements with respect to internal control systems stand out when it comes to non-compliance. In addition, the nature and content of the explanations provided for non-compliance are remarkably similar across companies, which may indicate symbolic compliance with the Code's best practice provisions. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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“…The non-exhaustive list incorporates employees; creditors and suppliers; community and environment; the company and its shareholders. 4 Notably the institutional investors are deemed to offer a greater level of oversight of corporations than regulators have previously managed. Thus ensuring that corporations are managed in a manner that is for the benefit of society generally as opposed to the costs that have been born under the concept of limited liability.…”

Section: Corporate Governance Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The regulator and many of the traders had no concept of the true nature of the investment that was being sold; they had been deceived. 4 The damage far exceeded any losses to shareholders but extended from job losses to depleted pension funds, damage to the economy and loss to shareholders etc. Whilst those in support of limited liability identify that those responsible for the companies' actions are generally liable in tort, in reality, there are a few that are truly held to account and they have less resources available than the corporations to rectify the damage caused.…”

Section: Damaging Effect Of Limited Liabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their knowledge of finance, the industry and corporations in which they invest has developed into the concept that shareholders could engage with the management of the corporation, helping to ensure that the company is managed in a responsible manner. 4 Some consider that institutional investors have become more active in their oversight role which has had an impact on global governance standards. Others would argue that codes such as the Stewardship Code 2012 (SC) require institutional investors to play a more active stewardship role and thus increase the governance of the corporation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Separation of Ownership and Control in Corporate Governance

2019

JLPG

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The Prevalence of Institutional Investors and their Growing Activism as Owners of Modern Corporations have had an Impact on Corporate Governance Structures Worldwide.This research will critically discuss the above statement in light of the ongoing debate on the phenomenon of separation of ownership and control.To achieve this we divide the research into six sections. The three major sections of the main body of this research consist of Corporate Governance Issues, the damaging effect of limited liability Companies and the effectiveness of shareholders as governors. The research has a suitable conclusion at the end.

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The importance of disclosure in corporate governance self-regulation across Europe: A review of the Winter Report and the EU Action Plan

Cited by 22 publications

References 5 publications

Codes of Good Governance

Codes of Good Governance

Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: an overview of the application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004

Separation of Ownership and Control in Corporate Governance

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