The Implications of Learning on Bidding Behavior in a Repeated First Price Conservation Auction with Targeting

James, Natasha A.; Lundberg, Lennart; Sills, Erin O.

doi:10.1561/102.00000101

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Creating competition among sellers of environmental services is one way to bring down these informational rents through conservation auctions or tenders (Bardsley 2008). Indeed, the emerging evidence suggests that auctions are, in fact, more cost-effective than fixed-price PES schemes (James, Lundberg, and Sills 2021). However, a limitation is that tenders have mainly (but not exclusively) been used in more developed countries where the preconditions of success such as land tenure rights, implementation capacity, and a willingness to participate are more likely to prevail.…”

Section: Continuedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nature's Frontiers: Achieving Sustainability, Efficiency, and Prosperity with Natural Capital

Damania¹,

Polasky²,

Ruckelshaus³

et al. 2023

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Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 26 25 24 23This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information, or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Nothing herein shall constitute or be construed or considered to be a limitation upon or waiver of the privileges and immunities of The World Bank, all of which are specifically reserved.

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Section: Continuedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nature's Frontiers: Achieving Sustainability, Efficiency, and Prosperity with Natural Capital

Damania¹,

Polasky²,

Ruckelshaus³

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Auctions are a class of designed markets that can be used to increase the efficiency of allocating ES contracts (Buckley et al, 2006;Ferraro, 2008;Comerford, 2013;Andeltová, 2018;Banerjee and Conte, 2018). They are described by a set of rules that specify how the winner is selected and how the monetary value of the resulting contract is determined (Wolfstetter, 1996;Hailu et al, 2010;James et al, 2021;Glebe, 2022). As possible approaches, auctions can be grouped as reverse or forward.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%