The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures

“…If (x N ,ŷ N ,p) is a WE and preferences are LNS, Theorem 10 implies thatp (x i −ŷ i ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . It follows that the same WE is a WELT relative to each permuted wealth distribution rule defined by (25). 2…”

“…In this sense, his results characterize the Walrasian mechanism uniquely. 25 To derive their results, Mount and Reiter in particular imposed a "local threadedness" condition on the correspondence µ : Θ N M requiring that, for each θ N ∈ Θ N , there should exist a neighbourhood U ofθ N and a continuous selection f : U → M satisfying f (θ N ) ∈ µ(θ N ) for all θ N ∈ U . 26 Jordan imposes a different "regularity" assumption requiring µ to be a continuous single-valued function on the restricted domain Θ N CD of "Cobb-Douglas" environments in which each X i = R G + and each utility function takes the form u i (x i ) ≡ g∈G (x i g ) α i g for some parameter vector α i ∈ R G ++ .…”

Dynamic Resource Allocation Withself-|Interested Agents in the Upstream Oil & Gas Iindustry

“…Hence, we outline some definitions related to the social choice function and their properties (Arrow, 1963;Dasgupta, Hammond, & Maskin, 1979;Mas-Colell et al, 1995;Myerson, 1981;Parkes, 2001). …”

“…Below are some definitions related to mechanism design and their properties (Dasgupta et al, 1979;Mas-Colell et al, 1995;Maskin, (2007); Myerson, 1981). The mechanism defines available strategies, and based on agents' strategies, a method is used to select the final outcome.…”

“…Hence, the agent will reveal their direct type and create a mechanism as defined (Dasgupta et al, 1979;Hurwicz, 1973;Mas-Colell et al, 1995;Maskin, (2007);Myerson, 1981;Parkes, 2001;Vickrey, 1961): The next section presents an example where we model the principal-agent relationship using an incentive scheme to se how payment amount affects the agent's effort.…”