THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES<sup>*</sup>

Caves, Richard E.; Crookell, Harold; Killing, J. Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0084.1983.mp45003002.x

Cited by 256 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 10 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…In a crosscountry survey of both licensors and licensees, Caves et al (1983) found several licensing agreements that included clauses specifically aimed at protecting one party from the other's opportunistic behavior. For example, exclusivity clauses are especially common when licensees must make technology-specific investments to commercialize the invention they have licensed in.…”

Section: Formal and Informal Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, technology transactions often require highly specialized complementary investments by the buyer or the seller, who are consequently highly exposed to the risk of 'hold up' (Shane, 2002). Third, firms dealing with technology transactions often face 'small number' bargaining problems, as only a limited number of players in the market can supply or exploit a certain technology, or have access to the appropriate downstream assets to commercialize it (Caves et al 1983;Contractor, 1981;Pisano, 1990;Schilling & Steensma, 2002).…”

Section: Formal and Informal Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Conti¹,

Gambardella²,

Novelli³

2013

The Academy of Management Annals

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This is the unspecified version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. is, the trade of elements of knowledge which are 'disembodied' from individuals, organizations and products. The aims of this paper are to bring together the various streams of research in this area and discuss their major assumptions and limitations, in order to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon, and identify promising paths for future research. We start our review by identifying the object of market exchange -that is, an invention whose knowledge has been codified and disembodied from individuals, organizations or artifacts. We then identify those factors that enable firms to trade inventions, distinguishing between institutional-, firm-, and industry-level factors. We close our analysis of the extant literature by discussing the implications of markets for inventions for firm behavior and performance. Against this background, we highlight an important avenue for future research. A neglected implication of the development of invention markets is that firms are confronted with a wide variety of technological paths from which to choose, because the opportunity to acquire technologies on the market offers them a greater variety that can their internal R&D departments. However, the streams of research on markets for inventions and on R&D allocation strategies have been surprisingly disconnected so far. Hence, in the final section, we start to establish and explore the link between these literatures, and to identify a research agenda in this domain. Permanent repository link3

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Section: Formal and Informal Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Formal and Informal Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Conti¹,

Gambardella²,

Novelli³

2013

The Academy of Management Annals

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“…A survey of patent licensors revealed that 27 per cent of licenses covered products for which there is no close substitute. See Caves, Crookell and Killing (1983). 4.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patent litigation, licensing, nonobviousness, and antitrust

Meurer¹

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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“…These few available 'pairs' lead to small-numbers bargaining conditions on the market. Additionally, Caves, Crookell et al (1983) argued that the different parties involved in a transaction have asymmetrical access to knowledge about the technology, which leads to opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, since technologies are usually transacted that still need certain developments until they can be fully utilized or a technology may not work properly at any new location for whatever reason (e.g.…”

Section: Growing Markets For Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Teece (1986, p.303) noted that there are particularly "difficulties in pricing an intangible asset" which is not at least due to the unique nature of the good. Caves, Crookell et al (1983) analyzing international technology transfer to foreign countries in terms of licensing provided an argumentation that the market for technology licenses, like other markets for intangible knowledge, is "susceptible to market failures" resulting from five prevalent obstacles. At the time when they published their study, they had observed that typically only very few companies were willing to license a technology they possess, while on the other hand the demand of companies that feel a specific need for a certain technology was limited, according to Contractor (1981).…”

Section: Growing Markets For Technologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology Market Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation - The Case of IP Auctions

Tietze

Herstatt

2008

SSRN Journal

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Recently the phenomena of external technology exploitation (ETE) has started to attract attention from scholars, businesses and politicians likewise alongside with a growth of the markets for technology. However, the markets for technology are still characterized by inhibiting obstacles that lead to high transaction costs, thus prohibit efficient transactions and result in market failure. Although, on the one hand the presence of obstacles lead to high transaction costs, the large market potential on the other hand provides incentives for technology market intermediaries (TMI) to develop new exploitation models to facilitate ETE transactions by reducing transaction costs. Throughout this paper we address the general research question of whether and how new exploitation models can actually facilitate ETE.To address this question, in a first step we generate insights into TMIs acting on the markets for technology and derived a conceptual basis for a further understanding of TMIs. Having carried out a detailed review of the literature, we develop a theory based typology for six TMI archetypes. Throughout this exercise we gain insights into the variety of different functions TMIs have on the markets for technology and various new ways how TMIs try to facilitate ETE transactions.Throughout the second part of this paper, we focus on IP auctions as one particular business model of the archetype 'IP Broker'. We investigate this 'young' business model presenting first insights into two qualitative studies. In a first step we derive a generic IP auction process based on a qualitative, empirical analysis of IP auction processes. We then translate these results into a theory based process view and derive a generic IP auction process as a specific type of an ETE process. Having thus generated a close understanding of the transaction process, we presented results from four cases of successful transactions, i.e. where patents were sold for particular high prices from two SMEs and two MNCs. The case studies are analyzed according to four main aspects including characteristics of the companies that exploited patented technologies (including motives and selection processes), the patented technology as such, the organization of the transaction and the companies' perceptions regarding the success of the transactions.

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THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES^*

Cited by 256 publications

References 10 publications

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Patent litigation, licensing, nonobviousness, and antitrust

Technology Market Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation - The Case of IP Auctions

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THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES*

Cited by 256 publications

References 10 publications

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Research on Markets for Inventions and Implications for R&D Allocation Strategies

Patent litigation, licensing, nonobviousness, and antitrust

Technology Market Intermediaries to Facilitate External Technology Exploitation - The Case of IP Auctions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

THE IMPERFECT MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY LICENSES^*