The imperfect agenda-setter: Why do legislative proposals fail in the EU decision-making process?

Abstract

This article analyzes how uncertainty about the location of the pivotal actor influences the outcome of Commission proposals. We argue that the Commission is an imperfect agenda-setter and expect that Commission proposals are more likely to fail when uncertainty increases in the bicameral legislature of the Council and the European Parliament. Considering all legislative acts decided under the co-decision procedure proposed in the period from November 1993 until December 2009, we focus on withdrawal of Commission proposals as failures. In the empirical analysis we distinguish between electoral and procedural uncertainty and provide evidence that both types of uncertainty explain withdrawal of Commission proposals.

One agenda-setter or many? The varying success of policy initiatives by individual Directorates-General of the European Commission 1994–2016

“…5 The adoption rate is high (cf. Boranbay-Akan et al., 2017). Only 13%, that is 405 of the cases, did not result in a binding European law, either because the proposals have been withdrawn or are technically still pending.…”

Loose Ties or Strong Bonds? The Effect of a Commissioner's Nationality and Partisanship on Voting in the Council

“…However, as the Council and the EP are essential for policies to be adopted, a Commissioner needs to be sensitive to the preferences of these institutions when formulating a legislative proposal (Crombez, 1997;Hartlapp et al, 2014;Leuffen and Hertz, 2010;Steunenberg, 1994;Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Furthermore, as time elapses between a Commissioner's decision to introduce a proposal and the Council's vote on that proposal, the Commissioner faces uncertainty regarding the exact position of the pivotal government in the Council (as discussed by Boranbay et al, 2015). the resulting proposal would be too moderate (as discussed by Wonka, 2008 in the context of the REACH directive).…”

“…However, it might not be possible (or desirable) for a Commissioner to accommodate the preferences of all Member States when introducing a legislative proposaleither because positions are not known with certainty or because the resulting proposal would be too moderate (as discussed by Wonka, 2008 in the context of the REACH directive). Furthermore, as time elapses between a Commissioner's decision to introduce a proposal and the Council's vote on that proposal, the Commissioner faces uncertainty regarding the exact position of the pivotal government in the Council (as discussed by Boranbay et al, 2015). From a Commissioner's perspective, 'no' votes are thus not entirely preventable.…”

At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply

“…Crombez and Hix, 2015) and implementation (Fjelstul and Carrubba, 2018; König and Luetgert, 2009) of EU law. More recent empirical findings cast doubt on whether the Commission has the strategic foresight necessary in order to strategically set the agenda (Boranbay-Akan et al., 2017; Osnabrügge, 2015). This literature also asks in how far the Commission’s monitoring and enforcement of EU law is effective.…”