The impartiality of Smith’s spectator: The problem of parochialism and the possibility of social critique

Abstract

Amartya Sen has argued that contractarian theories of justice inevitably fall victim to the problem of parochialism, for the reason that they rely on a problematically narrow conception of impartiality. Sen finds a corrective model of impartiality in Adam Smith's figure of the impartial spectator. In this essay, I argue that Sen's invocation of the spectator to resolve the problem of parochialism is unfounded, as the impartial spectator is fundamentally a product of socialization that serves to propagate conventional moral norms. I consider various interpretive avenues for ''rescuing'' the spectator from parochialism, and ultimately conclude that a minor amendment to Smith's account, resting on the possibility of a conscience informed by moral pluralism, is required.

Adam Smith, Settler Colonialism, and Limits of Liberal Anti-imperialism

“…particularism through the "self-correcting" tendency of moral spectatorship (Sayre-McCord 2010), resentment of cruelty as the basis of a universal ethics (Forman-Barzilai 2010), immanent criticism aided by public education (Schliesser 2017, 136-147), and the exposure of cultural sensitivities to "moral pluralism" (Golemboski 2018). With respect to colonialism, the tension is complicated by the fact that universalism and particularism can each be, and indeed has been, pressed into the defense as well as the critique of empire (Fitzmaurice 2014;Bell 2016).…”

Adam Smith, Colonialism, and Liberal Imperialism

“…It was not a theory of morality, but of how people come to think and act morally. Some commentators have focussed on this and argued that Smith's stress on explaining moral judgments, and his stress on the social nature of such judgements, mean we should read him as sceptic about the possibility of developing objective moral rules, or even as a kind of 'relativist' (Campbell, 1971;Fleischacker, 2011;Golemboski, 2018;Griswold, 1999). Certainly, this was one response to the Theory of Moral Sentiments when it was first published.…”

Moral Parochialism and the Limits of Impartiality

“…4 David Golemboski's reconstruction of Adam Smith's impartial spectator (European Journal of Political Theory, onlinefirst, February 2015) provides a useful first approximation to this problem. 5 Although Golemboski intends his account simply as a friendly amendment to the impartial spectator rather than as a full-fledged account of moral judgment, the limits of his proposal as a solution to the problem of moral parochialism are instructive enough that they warrant close attention, independent of the validity of his critique of Smith. What interests me in particular is not whether Golemboski's critique of Smith's impartial spectator hits the mark, but rather, to what extent Golemboski's reconstruction of Smith's impartial spectator succeeds at addressing the problem of moral parochialism, as Golemboski claims.…”