The Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and Reliability

Bozoyan, Christiane; Vogt, Sonja

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149542

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Though reputation scores grew more as a result of positive messages received, the possibility of social bonding did not cause significant improvement for cooperation. Our results are consistent with the fact that people place more weight on positive information if it comes from a stronger social bond [ 83 ]. The integration of received information from trusted sources is important for a well-functioning reputation system, but as social bonding did not improve significantly how reputations are used to condition behaviour, this treatment did not substantially improve cooperation overall.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

Samu

Takács

2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of gossip under such a conflict of interest. One is the possibility of voluntary checks of received evaluative information from different sources and the other is social bonding between the sender and the receiver. We tested the efficiency of cross-checking and social bonding in a laboratory experiment where subjects played the Prisoner's Dilemma with gossip interactions. Although individuals had confidence in gossip in both conditions, we found that, overall, neither the opportunities for cross-checking nor bonding were able to maintain cooperation. Meanwhile, strong competition for reputation increased cooperation when individuals' payoffs depended greatly on their position relative to their rivals. Our results suggest that intense competition for reputation facilitates gossip functioning as an informal device promoting cooperation. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 90%

Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

Samu

Takács

2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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“…Preferences for long-standing reputations over marginal ones will likely be even stronger in everyday settings where information is not always accurate and trustees can fabricate positive ratings (compare ref. 42). …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

Frey

Rijt

2016

Sci Rep

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Trust is an essential condition for exchange. Large societies must substitute the trust traditionally provided through kinship and sanctions in small groups to make exchange possible. The rise of internet-supported reputation systems has been celebrated for providing trust at a global scale, enabling the massive volumes of transactions between distant strangers that are characteristic of modern human societies. Here we problematize an overlooked side-effect of reputation systems: Equally trustworthy individuals may realize highly unequal exchange volumes. We report the results of a laboratory experiment that shows emergent differentiation between ex ante equivalent individuals when information on performance in past exchanges is shared. This arbitrary inequality results from cumulative advantage in the reputation-building process: Random initial distinctions grow as parties of good repute are chosen over those lacking a reputation. We conjecture that reputation systems produce artificial concentration in a wide range of markets and leave superior but untried exchange alternatives unexploited.

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“…For example, positive gossip includes praising a coworker whereas negative gossip includes blaming a coworker. Prior research has largely focused on the distinct implications of valence, particularly for the gossip target (Bozoyan & Vogt, 2016; Burt & Knez, 1996; Ellwardt, Labianca, & Wittek, 2012; Kniffin & Wilson, 2005; Sommerfeld et al, 2008). However, positive and negative gossip do not necessarily result in contrasting effects (Bozoyan & Vogt, 2016; Brady et al, 2017; Grosser et al, 2010), suggesting that the implications of valence may be more complex.…”

Section: Typology Of Gossipmentioning

confidence: 99%

An attributional process model of workplace gossip.

Lee¹,

Barnes²

2021

Journal of Applied Psychology

117

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Despite the ubiquity of gossip in the workplace, the management literature offers a limited understanding of its consequences for gossip senders. To understand whether gossiping is beneficial or detrimental for the gossip sender, it is necessary to consider the perspective of gossip recipients and their response to gossip. We develop a typology of gossip that characterizes archetypal patterns of interpreting gossip. We then draw from attribution theory to develop a multilevel process model of workplace gossip that focuses on how the gossip recipient’s attributions of a gossip episode shape the gossip recipient’s subsequent response and behaviors. In addition to the valence and work-relatedness dimensions of gossip that comprise the typology, we examine credibility and the status of the gossip target as fundamental features of the gossip episode that jointly affect the gossip recipient’s attributions. At the episodic level, the process of deciphering the gossip sender’s motives influences the subsequent reciprocation of gossip. Depending on the locus of causality attributed to the gossip episode, gossip also contributes to the perceived trustworthiness of the gossip sender and the gossip recipient’s cooperation with or social undermining of the gossip sender over time. The proposed model suggests that the potential benefits or social consequences of gossip for the gossip sender depend on the characteristics of the gossip and the context of the gossip episode that serve as inputs to the gossip recipient’s attributional process.

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The Impact of Third-Party Information on Trust: Valence, Source, and Reliability

Cited by 18 publications

References 38 publications

Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding

Arbitrary Inequality in Reputation Systems

An attributional process model of workplace gossip.

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