As Sara Kendall and Sarah M. H. Nouwen rightly notice, “legacy” is a big word, and it may be too soon even to begin to evaluate the legacies of the international criminal tribunals. Legacies are whatever future generations take from the tribunals. That, obviously, is in their hands, not the hands of the tribunals. So the question of legacies is more properly a question of bequests, and the inquiry must be a modest one: how do we evaluate the successes and failures of the tribunals in the here and now rather than the further future? Failures matter as well as successes, and as in science, failures can be as instructive and useful as successes. For example, many observers concluded that the tribunals, operating in The Hague and Arusha without an initial ground game in former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, were too far removed from the peoples who experienced the crimes; that perception helped motivate the movement toward hybrid tribunals. If that is right, the hybrid model counts amongthe “legacies” oftheInternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), if only in the negative way that they exposed a problem the hybrids tried to remedy. As another example, Kendall and Nouwen remarkthat the impunity of the RPF has also become part of ICTR’s legacy. That too would be an instructive failure—instructive, in this case, as a foretaste of how difficult it is to prosecute cases against an intransigent government in power, a lesson that the International Criminal Court’s (ICC)troubles in Sudan and Kenya confirm.