The impact of tariff policies on vaccine supply chains: short-term and evolutionary game behaviors based on uncertain utility

Dao-ming, Dai; Wu, Xuanyu; Si, Fengshan; Feng, Zhenan; Chu, Weishen

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2022.11.017

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…(3) the accountability of the superior government for the dereliction of duty of the regulatory authorities is of great signifcance to enhancing the stability of enterprises in building high-quality smart buildings; (4) it is also an effective way to prevent enterprises from building low-quality smart buildings by improving the sales revenue of smart buildings listed on the market and increasing the rentseeking cost of enterprises; and (5) when rumors appear, we need to strictly manage and supervise well-known bloggers, reduce the possibility of regulating individual reprints of rumors, avoid uncontrollable negative efects in the later period, and seriously afect the credibility of government supervision [24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

Yang

She

Guo

2023

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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The “14th Five-Year” development plan of the construction industry of the Chinese government makes it clear that intelligent buildings are the general direction of future construction development. However, the occurrence of construction accidents in recent years has brought huge casualties. With the rapid development of third-party inspection institutions, their judgment has become an important threshold for the access to smart buildings. The failure of inspection institutions to detect the renewal of leases may lead to the failure of intelligent systems, leading to the failure of construction equipment and causing major safety accidents such as the uncontrolled fall of construction elevators and the fall of tower crane items. As the supervisor of third-party inspection institutions, government functional departments are responsible for the failure of intelligent systems. All of them undertake the important role of intelligent building security. This paper builds an evolutionary game model with government regulatory authorities, third-party testing institutions, and intelligent construction enterprises as the three game parties, based on variables that affect the factors of the players, and discusses the possible scenarios of the stabilization strategy, which draws the following points: (1) the increase of incentives and penalties by the government is conducive to promoting the construction of high-quality intelligent buildings and the normative behavior of the third party without intention to seek rent, but the increase of incentives will not be conducive to the government fulfilling its regulatory responsibilities. (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is greater than their speculative returns so as to ensure the safety of intelligent buildings in the evolving and stable market environment. (3) The accountability of the superior government for the dereliction of duty of the regulatory authorities is of great significance to enhancing the stability of enterprises in building high-quality intelligent buildings. (4) It is also an effective way to avoid the construction of low-quality smart buildings by improving the listed sales income of enterprises and increasing the rent-seeking cost of enterprises. Combined with the improved SIR model, it is calculated that after the occurrence of a construction accident, when the rumor first appears, the rumor will quickly spread out of control without timely management and supervision. The conclusion of the game model provides a great reference value for the government’s regulatory behavior. The quality of the government’s regulatory behavior is directly related to the future of high-quality development of intelligent construction and also expands the application field of evolutionary game theory and SIR theory. The government should actively manage third-party testing institutions and intelligent building enterprises before construction accidents happen. After the accident, strict management and supervision should be carried out on well-known bloggers before the emergence of rumors so as to reduce the possibility of standardizing individuals’ reprinting of rumors and avoid the uncontrollable negative impact in the later period, thus seriously affecting the credibility of government supervision.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

Yang

She

Guo

2023

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Te largest Lyapunov exponent (LE) exhibits bifurcations and chaotic dynamics, whereby positive LE values indicate the occurrence of chaotic behavior. Te LE can be understood as the exponential rate at which the infnitesimally small separation between two nearby initial states in the evolving phase space expands over time [26]. In Figure 4, the LE remains negative when c 1 < 1.342, thus indicating the stability of the R&D competition system (12) due to the low adjustment speed of x 1 .…”

Section: Adjustment Speed Efectsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The Complexities in the R&D Competition Model with Spillover Effects in the Supply Chain

Xiao,

Xiao

2024

Complexity

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This study aims to investigate the research and development (R&D) competition within the supply chain, focusing on two aspects: R&D competition at the manufacturing level and competition in pricing strategies. This paper establishes a dynamic game model of R&D competition, comprising two manufacturers and two retailers, with both manufacturers exhibiting bounded rationality. The key findings are as follows: (1) an increase in the adjustment speed positively affects the chaotic nature of the R&D competition system, leading to a state of disorder. This chaotic state has adverse implications for manufacturing profitability. (2) The spillover effect exhibits a positive relationship with the level of chaos in the R&D competition system. A greater spillover effect contributes to a more turbulent environment, which subsequently impacts the profitability of manufacturers. (3) R&D cost parameters exert a positive influence on the stability of the R&D competition system. When the system reaches a state of equilibrium, an escalation in the R&D cost parameters poses a threat to manufacturer profitability. (4) Retailer costs play a detrimental role in the stability of the R&D competition system. As retailer costs increase, there is a decline in R&D levels, thereby diminishing manufacturer profitability. (5) To mitigate the chaotic state, we propose the implementation of the time-delayed feedback control (TDFC) method, which reflects a more stable state in the R&D competition system.

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“…Zou et al ( 39 ) studied the evolutionary game of government participation in low-carbon technology innovation to provide a reference for further improving the theory of green development ( 39 ). Dai et al ( 40 ) used game theory to study the vaccine supply chain from a long-term, dynamic perspective and found that the effective participation of residents is important ( 40 ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis of rural public–private partnership older adult care project in the context of population aging in China

Fu,

Huang,

et al. 2023

Front. Public Health

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IntroductionPublic–private partnership (PPP) older adult care project is an effective means to solve the dilemma of the aging population in China's rural areas, but there are some problems in the operation process, such as a low participation rate and poor service quality, resulting in the needs of rural older adult groups not being met.MethodsTo alleviate the pressure of the aging population in rural areas, this study establishes an evolutionary game model for the PPP older adult care project, then defines the interests of local government, the private sector, and rural older adult residents, based on which it discusses the strategic choices of the three parties in the evolutionary process, and finally analyzes the influencing factors of the strategic choices of the game parties through simulation.ResultsThe results suggest that whether the private sector chooses to actively participate in the project will be influenced by the willingness of local government and rural older adult residents to participate in the project. Local government could play the role of supervisor through reward and punishment mechanisms. Whether older rural residents choose to participate in the project depends on the number of benefits they would receive.DiscussionBased on these findings, local governments should clarify the responsibilities of relevant stakeholders, adopt a regulatory strategy combining subsidies and penalties, improve the participation efficiency of rural older adult residents, promote the effective operation of PPP older adult care projects, and improve the quality of rural older adult care services in the new era.

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The impact of tariff policies on vaccine supply chains: short-term and evolutionary game behaviors based on uncertain utility

Cited by 8 publications

References 50 publications

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

Multiagent Game of Intelligent Building Detection and Its Harm Rumor Analysis

The Complexities in the R&D Competition Model with Spillover Effects in the Supply Chain

Evolutionary game analysis of rural public–private partnership older adult care project in the context of population aging in China

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