The impact of social value orientation and risk attitudes on trust and reciprocity

Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran; Mestelman, Stuart; Nainar, Khalid; Shehata, Mohamed

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.12.003

Cited by 116 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…However, the absence of any effect of risk orientation in the prisoner's dilemma does not match with this idea (especially since social value orientations have produced strong and reliable effects in social dilemmas; see Van Lange, De Cremer, Van Dijk, and Van Vugt, 2007). To be sure, we also measured social value orientations in our study, and did not find any relationship with risk orientation or cooperation (see also Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009). Nevertheless, for future research it may be useful to investigate the connection between risk orientation and other constructs (e.g., trust, sensation seeking).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 78%

Framing prisoners and chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game

Heus

Hoogervorst

Dijk

2010

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 78%

Framing prisoners and chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game

Heus

Hoogervorst

Dijk

2010

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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“…We have used a repeated ultimatum game to examine the role of social distance 19 11.736 is the product of the regression coefficient 5.868 (from Model III in Table 4) and the Endogenous Index 2.00 and 5.868 is the product of the regression coefficient and the Endogenous Index 1.00. 20 For the fixed-partners treatment the three terms are −257.803X − 109.565N + 330.856XN where X and N are the values of the Exogenous and Endogenous Indices.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For whatever pairs of offers we consider, given that social value orientations and risk attitudes of the individuals are the same we expect to find it more likely that a larger offer will be accepted than a smaller offer. 19 The difference is significant (p = 0.000). The individual who received the LF200 offer is more likely to accept this offer than the individual who received the LF250 offer.…”

Section: Fairness Indicesmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Endogenous versus Exogenous Fairness Indices in Repeated Ultimatum Games

Gomaa¹,

Mestelman²,

Nainar³

et al. 2017

TEL

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In ultimatum games, we often observe some participants rejecting offers that may be normally viewed as "fair" while others accept even lower offers that are typically viewed as "unfair". The objective of this study is to construct and examine an endogenous fairness index that helps explain this phenomenon. To achieve this objective, we construct a repeated ultimatum game environment in which each participant plays the roles of both the sender and the receiver with two different participants. We conjecture that the ratio of the amount that an individual receives divided by the amount the individual sends, captures the benchmark of what constitutes a fair offer for that individual when an offer-acceptance decision has to be made. Our design includes a fixed-and random-partners treatment in the repeated ultimatum game as an attempt to identify and isolate the effects of social distance on offer-acceptance decisions. In addition to the inclusion of the fairness indices in the offer-acceptance models, we introduce measures of social value orientations and risk attitudes as control variables in our analyses. We find that our belief-related fairness index is, in some cases, a better explanatory variable for offer-acceptance decisions than the conventional "offer index" and in other cases significantly augments the "offer index". As well, the offer-acceptance model including the belief-related fairness index can account for likelihoods of accepting less fair offers that can, at times, exceed likelihoods of accepting more fair offers.

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“…From the social and behavioral literature we learn that social value orientations significantly accounts for variation in trust and reciprocity. Specifically, pro-social individuals reciprocate more as the trust increases, while pro-self reciprocate less as the trust increases [10]. People with a natural inclination to cooperate are at the same time vulnerable to being exploited.…”

Section: Social Value Orientation Agent Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Life Game: Cognitive Strategies for Repeated Stochastic Games

Cheng

Zuckerman

Nau

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Third Int'l Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust and 2011 IEEE Third Int'l Conference on Social Computing

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Abstract-Standard models in bio-evolutionary game theory involve repetitions of a single stage game (e.g., the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Stag Hunt); but it is clear that repeatedly playing the same stage game is not an accurate model of most individuals' lives. Rather, individuals' interactions with others correspond to many different kinds of stage games.In this work, we concentrate on discovering behavioral strategies that are successful for the life game, in which the stage game is chosen stochastically at each iteration. We present a cognitive agent model based on Social Value Orientation (SVO) theory. We provide extensive evaluations of our model's performance, both against standard agents from the game theory literature and against a large set of life-game agents written by students in two different countries. Our empirical results suggest that for life-game strategies to be successful in environments with such agents, it is important (i) to be unforgiving with respect to trust behavior and (ii) to use adaptive, fine-grained opponent models of the other agents.

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The impact of social value orientation and risk attitudes on trust and reciprocity

Cited by 116 publications

References 37 publications

Framing prisoners and chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game

Framing prisoners and chickens: Valence effects in the prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game

Endogenous versus Exogenous Fairness Indices in Repeated Ultimatum Games

The Life Game: Cognitive Strategies for Repeated Stochastic Games

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