The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations

Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments—An experimental study

“…Analyzing data from a TV-show that has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, Belot et al (2006) also find that a player's promise to cooperate is a very good predictor for his actual cooperation. 24 In the context of public goods games (without any inter-team competition), Masclet et al (2003) or Rege and Telle (2004) have found a positive effect of non-monetary (and non-verbal) sanctions on the level of cooperation within groups. 25 The same holds true for the INTER treatment where subjects could only communicate with a member of the competing team, but not with members of their own team.…”

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

“…Players do not merely respond 6 to the threat of punishment or the promise of a reward, but they update constantly, taking account of their experience [5]. If players are told that they will be re-matched with the same co-players, or that their decisions will be made known, they often change their behaviour, obviously motivated by concerns for longer-lasting interactions or for reputation [50][51][52][53]. Similarly, if they can opt out of the Public Good game, or back into it, they base their decisions on the current state of the population and adapt rapidly [54].…”

On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments

“…In addition, Noussair and Tucker (2005) show that contributions to the public good are higher when both types of sanctions are present than if just one of the two types is available. Rege and Telle (2004) report that contributions to a one-shot public good game played among strangers are significantly higher when individual contributions are made public at the end of the game, thus facilitating social approval/disapproval -in contrast, Gächter and Fehr (1999) do not observe this phenomenon in a 10-period public good game. Peeters and Vorsatz …”