Abstract:In recent years, semi-presidentialism-where a constitution creates a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature-has become the regime type of choice for nascent democracies. There are now nearly 60 countries with semi-presidential constitutions. 1 And yet, the academic consensus is resolutely opposed to the adoption of semi-presidentialism. When Afghanistan was crafting its new constitution in 2003, a briefing report summed up the general … Show more
“…Domestically, the Palestinian political landscape is shaped by the divide between Hamas and Fatah, which originates, to a significant degree, from disagreements over the Palestinian conduct toward Israel (Cavatorta & Elgie, 2010; Sirriyeh, 2011). The conflict came to a head in 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections for the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Legislative Council.…”
In discussions of water management during conflict, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) primarily feature in relation to the strategic use of water resources to gain military or political advantage, but not as actors of civil governance within territories under their control. Given the humanitarian importance of water services, we study the role of NSAGs in wartime water governance and their interactions with other actors, based on empirical data from three cases in the Middle East: (1) the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, (2) the Houthi-controlled north of Yemen, and (3) Northeastern Syria under the control of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its Syrian Democratic Forces. Our theoretical framework builds on previous studies on rebel governance to analyze NSAG involvement in local water service provision, water infrastructure development, and institutional processes related to policy-making and long-term planning. We find differences between the three cases regarding the access to external funds and the local expectations toward public water services, and identify financial interests and local legitimacy as main motivations for NSAG’s involvement in water governance. Our results also show several examples of water service provision in NSAG-controlled areas being “outsourced” to other actors, including state authorities, private providers and international organizations.
“…Domestically, the Palestinian political landscape is shaped by the divide between Hamas and Fatah, which originates, to a significant degree, from disagreements over the Palestinian conduct toward Israel (Cavatorta & Elgie, 2010; Sirriyeh, 2011). The conflict came to a head in 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections for the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Legislative Council.…”
In discussions of water management during conflict, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) primarily feature in relation to the strategic use of water resources to gain military or political advantage, but not as actors of civil governance within territories under their control. Given the humanitarian importance of water services, we study the role of NSAGs in wartime water governance and their interactions with other actors, based on empirical data from three cases in the Middle East: (1) the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, (2) the Houthi-controlled north of Yemen, and (3) Northeastern Syria under the control of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and its Syrian Democratic Forces. Our theoretical framework builds on previous studies on rebel governance to analyze NSAG involvement in local water service provision, water infrastructure development, and institutional processes related to policy-making and long-term planning. We find differences between the three cases regarding the access to external funds and the local expectations toward public water services, and identify financial interests and local legitimacy as main motivations for NSAG’s involvement in water governance. Our results also show several examples of water service provision in NSAG-controlled areas being “outsourced” to other actors, including state authorities, private providers and international organizations.
“…The show was banned from the network in 2011, based on a ruling dating back to before occupation which stated the government could take legal action for 'slander against the authority' (Sienkiewicz 2012). A government's effort to control the media within their country can be seen as an attempt to manipulate its citizens and control their livelihood and political aspirations (Cavatorta & Elgie 2010).…”
The constant rendering of Palestinian national identity provides crucial insight not only to the current Palestinian community’s political status, but also to past and the future experiences. National identity echoes the intersectionality of history and local politics. For the last few decades, Palestinian national identity has been evolving with continuous alteration that encompasses local political discourse in the Palestinian community. Whereas it once embraced unity among different political ideologies, a shift occurred with Hamas election victory in 2006, which resulted in the division of the Palestinian community, whereby the Palestinian Authority, under Abbas leadership is ruling the West Bank, and Hamas is governing the Gaza Strip. This political tension has served to render national identity. Palestinian children echoed such politics in the construction of their national identity through their interpretation of personal experiences that are intertwined with current political events. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show how Palestinian children articulated national identity in a post-Arafat/Abbas era, recognizing that national identity is not static.
“…Premiärministern riskerar så att säga att bli klämd mellan president och parlament, vilket kan vara synnerligen problematiskt om presidenten saknar majoritetsstö d i parlamentet. Risken uppstår då fö r parlamentariska låsningar och regeringskriser (Cavatorta & Elgie 2010). Presidenten kan då välja att avsätta premiärministern men måste i så fall ha parlamentariskt stö d fö r att kunna utse en annan efterträdare.…”
Section: Semipresidentialism Och Dess Två Varianterunclassified
Ukraine has repeatedly shifted between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, i.e. between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent theoretical arguments against premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems are relevant for understanding the shifting directions of the Ukrainian regime. As a point of departure, I formulate three main claims from the literature: 1) ''President-parliamentarism is less conducive to democratization than premierpresidentialism.'' 2) ''Semi-presidentialism in both its variants have built-in incitements for intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister.'' 3) ''Semipresidentialism in general, and president-parliamentarism in particular, encourages presidentialization of political parties.'' I conclude from the study's empirical overview that the president-parliamentary system Á the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratization Á has been instrumental in strengthening presidential dominance and authoritarian tendencies. The premier-presidential period 2006Á2010 was by no means smooth and stable, but the presidential dominance weakened and the survival of the government was firmly anchored in the parliament. During this period, there were also indications of a gradual strengthening of institutional capacity among the main political parties and the parliament began to emerge as a significant political arena.
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