The Impact of Managerial Ownership, Monitoring and Accounting Standard Choice on Accrual Mispricing

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. offering evidence related to the cross-sectional difference in the degree of accrual mispricing, our results give also some insights related to the cross-country variation of this phenomenon. Terms of use: Documents in JEL Classification: G32, G34, M4, M41

The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Restatement of Financial Statements: An Empirical Study of the Listed Companies in Egypt

“…The managerial ownership is one of particular importance to the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms used in a firm to limit the ability to make earnings management and thereby it will help in reducing the possibility of financial restatements. The agency theory suggests that the managerial ownership may lead to a better quality of accounting information (Gegenfurtner et al, 2009), thus firms which have high levels of managerial ownership imitate to reflect the prepared financial statements in a true matter, which limit the occurrence of restatements in financial statements of the firm. According to institutional ownership, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) implied that large-institution shareholders play a significant role in corporate governance.…”