The impact of managerial job security on corporate entrepreneurship: Evidence from corporate venture capital programs

Abstract

Research Summary We examine the role of managerial job security in the adoption of innovative practices and structures. Utilizing state level antitakeover protections as an exogenous shock, we find that when managers are afforded greater job security through these protections they exhibit a higher probability of initiating a Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) program. Furthermore, the positive effect of job security on CVC adoption is stronger when firms are research intensive, and when there are slack financial resources. Our results suggest that providing managers leeway to experiment while ensuring job security is important for corporate entrepreneurship and the willingness to experiment with innovative strategies. Managerial Summary Entrepreneurial activity often involves identifying opportunities that the rest of the marketplace overlooks. While this risk taking is celebrated as part of entrepreneurial folklore, in pragmatic terms, for managers of public organizations, it requires going against the prevailing wisdom of important stakeholders. Since stakeholders can hold considerable influence over top managers' employment, managers may avoid innovation if they feel experimentation and/or failure could cost them their jobs. This study demonstrates that when top managers have more job security, they are more likely to experiment with new organizational forms and structures by establishing Corporate Venture Capital units. The study demonstrates that job security not only impacts the amount of risk taken within existing operations, but also the willingness to experiment with novel ideas and activities.

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