The impact of institutional constraints on the Limarí River Valley water market

Hadjigeorgalis, Ereney; Lillywhite, Jay M.

doi:10.1029/2003wr002701

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…The effectiveness of water markets is also reported in other countries, such as Australia, USA, Chile and South Africa [27]. In drought circumstances, Australia and Chile transferred more than 20% of their total water use by using water markets [28,29]. In California, water transferred using water markets was less, around 5% of the total water use in the region [30], showing a similar percentage to the water transfer rate registered in the Spanish south-eastern river basins.…”

Section: Aggregated Transfersmentioning

confidence: 76%

Water Markets in Spain: Performance and Challenges

Palomo-Hierro

Gómez‐Limón

Riesgo

2015

Water

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Law 46/1999 incorporated formal water markets into the Spanish legal and regulatory framework, allowing spot water markets and the creation of water banks. The implementation of water markets in Spain aimed at improving the efficiency of water use by reallocating water towards uses with higher added value. However, the performance of water markets in Spain has been rather disappointing, since they have been operative only during drought periods, and even under these extreme scarcity situations, trading activity counted for less than 5.0% of total water use. The narrowness of the market suggests that there are some barriers hampering their effective functioning. This paper examines the evolution and performance of water markets in Spain, relying on a transaction costs analysis framework. This analysis allows the identification of the main factors impeding water markets from operating effectively as a water reallocation tool. This analysis also provides some guidelines on how to overcome these obstacles and, thus, how to improve the efficiency of water use.

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Section: Aggregated Transfersmentioning

confidence: 76%

Water Markets in Spain: Performance and Challenges

Palomo-Hierro

Gómez‐Limón

Riesgo

2015

Water

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“…Entre los países con mayor volumen de agua intercambiado se encuentran Australia y Chile, que puede llegar a superar el 10% del total de los recursos consumidos (Hadjigeorgalis & Lillywhite 2004), siendo muy superior a los volúmenes que se movilizan en España. En este sentido, en los estados del oeste de los Estados Unidos, las transferencias de agua son similares a las de las cuencas del sureste español y no llegan a superar el 5% del consumo total en los períodos más secos (Briscoe 1997;Hanak & Stryjewski 2012).…”

Section: Experiencia Internacionalunclassified

Retos Y Oportunidades De La Implantación De Los Bancos De Agua en España

López¹,

Limón²,

Martín³

2016

XXXIV Congreso Nacional De Riegos

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“…Temporary transactions may allow water rights holders to lease water for a specified time or volume and are favored over permanent transfers where allocation values are uncertain. The key benefit to temporary transactions is that water rights ownership does not change (Hadjigeorgalis & Lillywhite, 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Promoting Competitive Water Resource Use Efficiency at the Water‐Market Scale: An Intercooperative Demand Equilibrium‐Based Approach to Water Trading

Delorit

Block

2018

Water Resources Research

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Water rights law and corresponding markets exist to promote economic water resource use efficiency by permitting water rights holders to trade allocations. In some regions, hydrologic uncertainty drives annual assignment of per‐water right allocation values. Water rights holders, specifically those involved in agricultural production, may use collaborative water resource decision making to mitigate allocation uncertainty and promote economic and social efficiency. Such is the case in semi‐arid North Chile, where interactions between representative farmer groups, treated as resource competitive growers’ cooperatives, and modeled at water market‐scale, can provide both price and water right allocation distribution signals for unregulated, temporary water right markets. For the range of feasible per‐water right allocation values, a coupled agricultural‐economic model is developed to describe the equilibrium distribution of water, the corresponding market price of water rights, and the net surplus generated by collaboration between competing agricultural uses. A static, demand‐based allocation redistribution ruleset is generated by which the cooperatives are constrained to abide. Water right supply and demand inequality impacts at the market‐scale are used to characterize market performance under existing water rights law, and to evaluate the efficacy of intercooperative collaboration over the period 2000–2015. Exclusive intercooperative water trading, following a demand‐based ruleset, produces joint mean annual expected profits 24%–122% larger than a case of no‐interaction, depending on initial rights distribution. The broader insights of this research suggest that water rights holders engaged in agriculture can achieve enhanced benefits by forming crop‐type cooperatives and implementing demand‐based allocation redistribution rulesets.

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The impact of institutional constraints on the Limarí River Valley water market

Cited by 21 publications

References 12 publications

Water Markets in Spain: Performance and Challenges

Water Markets in Spain: Performance and Challenges

Retos Y Oportunidades De La Implantación De Los Bancos De Agua en España

Promoting Competitive Water Resource Use Efficiency at the Water‐Market Scale: An Intercooperative Demand Equilibrium‐Based Approach to Water Trading

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