The impact of contractual governance on forms of opportunism

Zhao, Danyang; Gu, Flora F.; Wang, Longwei

doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2022.01.006

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…From the perspective of knowledge exchange, a complete contractual coordination mechanism includes reporting systems for the progress of cooperation projects and timely written notices regarding behaviors that deviate from the original objectives [31,32] to build a formal explicit knowledge exchange network for the operation of an IUR cooperation. A complex contractual coordination mechanism generally stipulates the specific technology required to perform a cooperative task and requires the task executor to communicate and report the information content, use, and implementation effect of the technology regularly or irregularly through formal communication channels such as meetings, emails, and documents [4,33] to provide the enterprise with an opportunity to acquire and absorb a large amount of explicit knowledge.…”

Section: Influence Of Contractual Coordination On Knowledge Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, contractual control can increase the cost of enterprises' self-interest behaviors, change the payment structure, and reduce the probability of the game result of opportunistic behaviors [44]. Second, contractual control clearly stipulates the allowable or impermissible scope of the behavior of all the parties involved, improves the transparency of the cooperative relationship, and is conducive to reducing the possibility of opportunistic behaviors [32]. In reality, the contractual control mechanism is embodied in protective contractual terms mainly involving audit and supervision rights [19], intellectual property protection [12], confidentiality agreements [31], dispute arbitration [31], and legal litigation [19].…”

Section: Influence Of Contractual Control On Knowledge Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

Wan

Lan

2022

Sustainability

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China’s economic growth is transforming from being traditional and factor-driven to being innovation-driven. How to improve the independent innovation ability and build the sustainable competitiveness of enterprises through knowledge transfer in industry–university–research-institute (IUR) cooperation has become an urgent problem to be solved. The obstacles to knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation include internal and external cooperation risk factors. Improving the governance mechanism of an IUR cooperation, reducing cooperation risks, and promoting knowledge transfer are effective means for overcoming such obstacles in the short term. Interorganizational governance mechanisms include contractual governance and relationship governance. Obvious differences exist in the target functions of the different types of governance mechanisms, and their effects on knowledge transfer also differ. Based on a questionnaire survey on the IUR cooperation innovation of 364 enterprises, this study discusses the impact of the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism on knowledge transfer in the IUR cooperation. Different types of contractual governance mechanisms have different effects on knowledge transfer. The contractual coordination mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation but has no significant impact on tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the contractual control mechanism significantly promotes explicit knowledge transfer but hinders tacit knowledge transfer. Meanwhile, the relationship governance mechanism has a significant positive impact on explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer. The joint use of the contractual coordination mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly promote explicit knowledge transfer and tacit knowledge transfer, whereas the joint use of the contractual control mechanism and relationship governance mechanism can significantly weaken the two types of knowledge transfer. This study provides not only a theoretical explanation for the dispute over the “complementarity” or “substitution” relationship between the contractual governance mechanism and relationship governance mechanism in knowledge transfer in an IUR cooperation, thereby enriching relationship governance theory and knowledge management theory, but also a reference to the government, enterprises, and universities/scientific institutions participating in an IUR cooperation.

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Section: Influence Of Contractual Coordination On Knowledge Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Influence Of Contractual Control On Knowledge Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

Wan

Lan

2022

Sustainability

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“…However, in many cases, during the implementation process, business parties do not comply with the provisions of the contract and violate it to fulfil their own interests. In these cases, opportunism is in the strong form (Zhao et al, 2022). In addition, apart from formal contracts, economic actors participating in business cooperation often have a number of informal agreements that are not mentioned in the formal contract, which they need to understand and follow.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, if opportunistic behaviours occur after business parties sign the contract, it is called expost opportunism (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Thus, if we classify the magnification of opportunism from both timebased and formal contract-based perspectives, it can be said that ex-post opportunism can be either the strong form or weak form of opportunism, while ex-ante opportunism can only be the weak form of opportunism because at that time when it happens, the formal contract does not exist yet (Zhao et al, 2022).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unexplored Antecedents of Agent Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: An Interviewed-Based Exploratory Study

Pham,

Yokozawa,

Anh

2022

OSCM: An Int. Journal

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Opportunism is a common issue in buyer-supplier relationships. However, while many existing studies investigate interfirm-level opportunism, a few studies investigate individual-level opportunism, and currently, there has been a call for further research on how to manage individual-level opportunism. Thus, to contribute to the current research trend, this study examines factors influencing individual supplier agent opportunism. Data was collected by an interview-based exploratory study of 24 practitioners, from December 2018 and March 2020. The results from data coding and analysis identify two groups of important factors in managing supplier agent opportunism: 1) organisational factors group includes buyersupplier companies' long-term relationships, buyer companies' dependence, co-worker support for buyer agent, job demands for supplier agent; 2) individual factors group includes close relationships between buyer agent and supplier agent, buyer agents' purchasing knowledge, communication skills, and honesty in negotiation.

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“…Contractual governance can promote information sharing and hasten organizational responsiveness during a crisis. However, relying solely on contractual instruments to manage relationships can potentially heighten opportunism during the transaction process [15]. Therefore, relational governance is needed to provide functional supplement to the contractual governance mechanism [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource and Cognitive Perspectives: Unraveling the Influence Mechanism of Project Governance on Organizational Resilience in Infrastructure Projects

Lv,

Chen,

Wang

2023

Buildings

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The tendency of infrastructure projects to be complex, large-scale, and long-term prompts temporary project organizations’ need to have resilience to deal with various risks, uncertainties, and crises. The resource and cognitive capacity of stakeholders are key factors in infrastructure project governance and crisis response in the face of shock generation. Moreover, previous studies on organizational resilience of infrastructure projects have lacked exploration from project governance perspectives. Hence, the objective of this study is to investigate the influence of contractual and relational governance on the organizational resilience of infrastructure projects from the perspectives of resource reconfiguration and organizational cognition. Firstly, this study established a conceptual model through a theoretical background and hypotheses development. Then, a questionnaire was designed for participants in the infrastructure projects to collect data on the respective effects of each variable. A total of 519 complete responses to the questionnaire were collected, and a path model was developed to quantitatively measure the impact of contractual and relational governance on organizational resilience using the partial least squares–structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) method. Finally, the model was validated using reliability and validity testing, hypotheses testing, and mediating effect testing. The results of the study showed that the contractual and relational governance can enhance the level of organizational resilience. Resource reconfiguration and organizational cognition play a mediating role in the relationship between project governance and organizational resilience. This study extends the theoretical research on the impact of project governance on organizational resilience, and deepens the intrinsic link between the two from the perspective of resource reconfiguration and organizational cognition, so as to provide effective theoretical guidance for crisis response and sustainable operation of infrastructure projects.

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The impact of contractual governance on forms of opportunism

Cited by 15 publications

References 73 publications

Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

Substitution or Complementarity: Influence of Industry–University–Research-Institute Cooperation Governance Mechanism on Knowledge Transfer—An Empirical Analysis from China

Unexplored Antecedents of Agent Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: An Interviewed-Based Exploratory Study

Resource and Cognitive Perspectives: Unraveling the Influence Mechanism of Project Governance on Organizational Resilience in Infrastructure Projects

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