The Impact of Concentrations of Religious Denominational Affiliations on the Rate of Currently Divorced in Counties in the United States

Mullins, Larry C.; Brackett, Kimberly P.; Bogie, Donald W.; Pruett, Daniel

doi:10.1177/0192513x06287185

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(102 reference statements)

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“…The Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies who collected these data classified churches as belonging in various traditions, including evangelical conservative and Latter Day Saints 2 . This data source has been used as a reliable measure of the presence of conservative churches in several analyses (e.g., Blanchard 2007; Blanchard et al 2008; Mullins et al 2006). Total adherents to nonblack evangelical, fundamentalist, Latter Day Saints, and Christian sect churches were summed and divided by the census estimate of the nonblack population of the county 3…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When denominations were not included in their classification, we classified the groups based on information given in J. Gordon Melton's Encyclopedia of American Religions (6th edition) and Frank S. Mead and Samuel S. Hill's Handbook of Denominations in the United States (10th edition)." the presence of conservative churches in several analyses (e.g., Blanchard 2007;Blanchard et al 2008;Mullins et al 2006). Total adherents to nonblack evangelical, fundamentalist, Latter Day Saints, and Christian sect churches were summed and divided by the census estimate of the nonblack population of the county.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Conservative Churches and Fertility Innovation: A Cultural‐Ecological Approach to the Second Demographic Transition Among Nonblacks in the United States

Morrison

2009

Scientific Study of Religion

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This article investigates whether the prevalence of conservative churches, which has been associated with variation in demographic patterns in Western Europe (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002), can explain geographic differences in family demographic patterns-specifically fertility-in the U.S. nonblack population. Lesthaeghe and Neels find that a second demographic transition (SDT)-characterized by increasing prevalence of nontraditional family and household structure-is hindered by the presence of strong conservative religious institutions. The high religiosity of the United States compared with Western Europe makes it an interesting test case for the theory. This article analyzes the relationship between nonblack fertility and rates of membership in conservative Protestant and Latter Day Saint churches (conservative churches) among nonblacks in U.S. counties and shows that conservative church membership indeed is an independent factor in geographic differences in family demographic patterns-especially with regard to the timing of parenting, but less so with regard to nonmarital childbearing.This article contributes to understanding recent increases in age of parenting and nonmarital childbearing and recent decreases in marital childbearing in the United States (Teachman, Polonko, and Scanzoni 1999). These changes were part of a larger set of transformations in family and household demographic patterns that have been collectively identified as the "second demographic transition" (SDT) (van de Kaa 1987). Several theories have emerged to account for the SDT and for spatial variation in timing and strength of the SDT in the United States (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). This article tests whether a cultural-ecological perspective, the theory of ideational shift (Lesthaeghe 1998), that was developed to explain variation in Europe (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002), may also apply to the United States. The findings-that prevalence of conservative Protestants and Latter Day Saints (CP + LDS) adherents predicts spatial variation in the level and timing of change in three fertility outcomes-suggests that cultural differences across the landscape do matter for family demographic outcomes. LITERATURE REVIEWDuring the last third of the 20th century, there were substantial changes in U.S. fertility patterns, including: (1) decrease in marital fertility; (2) increase in nonmarital fertility; and (3) increase in the age of childbearing (Teachman, Polonko, and Scanzoni 1999). These changes coincided with (4) increase in divorce; (5) increase in the age at first marriage; (6) increase Acknowledgments: This article benefited from the constructive feedback and comments from

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservative Churches and Fertility Innovation: A Cultural‐Ecological Approach to the Second Demographic Transition Among Nonblacks in the United States

Morrison

2009

Scientific Study of Religion

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“…Sander (1993) finds that although older Baptist men are more likely to experience divorce than Catholic men and that older Catholic women are somewhat less likely to experience divorce than non-Baptist Protestant women, Catholicism has no effect on the odds that younger men and women will divorce. Using county-level aggregated data, Mullins et al (2006) find that higher divorce rates are significantly related to a lower concentration of moderate Protestants, miscellaneous Protestants, Catholics, and Mormons. However, Glass and Levchak (2014) begin their study by asserting that states with larger proportions of religious conservatives have higher divorce rates than states with lower proportions of religious conservatives and found that moderate Protestants marry early and have low levels of educational attainment and income, which could explain a substantial portion of the association.…”

Section: Religionmentioning

confidence: 97%

A matter of norms: Family background, religion, and generational change in the diffusion of first union breakdown among French-speaking Quebeckers

Laplante¹

2016

DemRes

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BACKGROUNDPrevious research conducted in societies where unmarried cohabitation remains limited suggests that having grown up with unmarried parents fosters marital instability. There is little research on this relationship in societies where unmarried cohabitation has become common. OBJECTIVEWe take advantage of the concurrent diffusion of unmarried cohabitation and union breakdown among French-speaking Quebeckers to examine whether family background (having grown up with unmarried parents and parental separation) and religion (reporting a denomination and religious attendance) have been key factors (intermediate variables) in the diffusion of conjugal instability or have been different consequences of a process of normative change unfolding across cohorts. METHODSWe use a subsample of 2,265 first unions from the 2011 Canadian General Social Survey. We estimate the hazard function and the effects of the independent variables on the hazard of breakdown using Royston-Parmar flexible hazards models. RESULTSResults show that having grown up with unmarried parents has no effect on the hazard of breakdown despite the increasing proportion of respondents having lived in this form of family, whereas religious attendance does have an effect despite its decreasing importance. Parental separation increases the hazard of marital disruption for men but not for women. CONTRIBUTIONAmong French-speaking Quebeckers, the diffusion of unmarried cohabitation and of union breakdown seem to be two aspects of a profound shift in norms regarding family life rather than being related to each other in a direct causal way.1 Centre Urbanisation Culture Société, Institut national de la recherche scientifique, Université du Québec, Canada. E-Mail: benoit.laplante@ucs.inrs.ca.Laplante: Family background, religion, and generational change in the diffusion of first union breakdown 784http://www.demographic-research.org Context and objectivesThe transformations that occurred in family life among French-speaking Quebeckers over the last decades, and especially the concurrent diffusion of unmarried cohabitation and union breakdown, provide a unique setting for the study of the relation between some aspects of normative and behavioural change in family life. Union breakdown was still relatively uncommon among the people born between 1931 and 1940: Only 20% of their first union ended in breakdown after 30 years. However, more than half of first unions broke down after fewer than 20 years among the people born between 1971 and 1980. This change did not occur alone. Whereas marriage was the normal onset of conjugal life for almost all individuals born between 1931 and 1940, more than 90% of those born between 1971 and 1980 started their conjugal life with unmarried cohabitation, most of them not having married their partner before the breakdown of the union or the time of the survey. These changes occurred as religious affiliation decreased and religious attendance plummeted. From one cohort to the next, the proportion of children who grew ...

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“…Several studies have found that affiliation with conservative Protestantism is either unassociated with divorce after controlling for relevant sociodemographic factors (Barna Group 2001Group , 2004Call and Heaton 1997;Glenn and Supancic 1984;Wilcox 2009) or even positively associated with divorce, particularly in the aggregate (Chi and Houseknecht 1985;Glass and Levchak 2014;Mullins et al 2006). Indeed, some studies suggest that the extreme pro-marriage norms espoused by theologically conservative religious communities actually indirectly increase marital dissolution by promoting earlier marriage and lower female education (Glass and Levchak 2014;Lehrer and Son 2017).…”

Section: Religion and Divorce In The United Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Their Fault, Not Mine: Religious Commitment, Theological Conservatism, and Americans’ Retrospective Reasons for Divorce

Perry

2018

Religions

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How does religion influence the ways divorcées frame their divorce experience? Building on Mills's "vocabularies of motive" concept, I theorize that Americans who are more religious or affiliated with a conservative Protestant tradition will be more likely to emphasize their former spouse's role in the divorce while minimizing their own. Data are taken from a large, representative sample of divorced Americans in the 2014 Relationships in America survey. Analyses affirm that divorced Americans who attend worship services more frequently are more likely to say that their former spouse wanted the divorce more than they did. Looking at 17 specific reasons for divorce, those who feel religion is more important to them are consistently more likely to select reasons that put blame on their former spouse or circumstances, while frequent attendees are less likely to cite their own behaviors or intentions. Though less consistent, notable patterns also emerged for conservative Protestants. Given the stigma against divorce in many religious communities, I argue that divorcées in such communities likely feel internal pressure to account for their divorce in ways that deflect blame.

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The Impact of Concentrations of Religious Denominational Affiliations on the Rate of Currently Divorced in Counties in the United States

Cited by 17 publications

References 55 publications

Conservative Churches and Fertility Innovation: A Cultural‐Ecological Approach to the Second Demographic Transition Among Nonblacks in the United States

Conservative Churches and Fertility Innovation: A Cultural‐Ecological Approach to the Second Demographic Transition Among Nonblacks in the United States

A matter of norms: Family background, religion, and generational change in the diffusion of first union breakdown among French-speaking Quebeckers

Their Fault, Not Mine: Religious Commitment, Theological Conservatism, and Americans’ Retrospective Reasons for Divorce

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