2018
DOI: 10.18685/ejbme(9)1_ejbme-17-021
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The impact of CEO' duality and board's size and independence on firms’ innovation and financial performance

Abstract: The aim of this article is to highlight the impact of some characteristics of board of directors and CEO' duality on firms' innovation and performance. A series of hypotheses testing the links between the variables was formulated in the basis of a theoretical review. A quantitative research was performed via a questionnaire on a sample of 60 Tunisian listed companies. Moreover, we used a database published by the Stock Exchange of Tunisian Market and the Financial Market Council. Results of the empirical analy… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

5
18
0

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

1
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(23 citation statements)
references
References 24 publications
5
18
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Therefore, this evidence supports the view of agency theory that CEO duality is no more advantageous to the firm performance since it permits the board exposers to a threat of imbalance and permits a conflict (Dalton and Kesner, 1987;Tricker, 1994). This result is consistent with Doğan et al (2013) and Blibech and Berraies, (2018). Thus, it provides a strong evidence to support a view that CEO duality could be blamed for poor performance in Bangladeshi listed companies.…”
Section: Results Of Regression Analysissupporting
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Therefore, this evidence supports the view of agency theory that CEO duality is no more advantageous to the firm performance since it permits the board exposers to a threat of imbalance and permits a conflict (Dalton and Kesner, 1987;Tricker, 1994). This result is consistent with Doğan et al (2013) and Blibech and Berraies, (2018). Thus, it provides a strong evidence to support a view that CEO duality could be blamed for poor performance in Bangladeshi listed companies.…”
Section: Results Of Regression Analysissupporting
confidence: 92%
“…In addition, a board with duality is typically over controlled by the executives; it threatens the good governance practices in the corporation (Tricker, 1994;Yermack, 1996). Empirical evidence (such as Daily and Dalton, 1994;Carter et al, 2003;Doğan et al, 2013;Blibech and Berraies, 2018) confirms the detrimental impact of duality on corporate performance. Consistent with the agency theory, this study hypothesizes that CEO duality is not advantageous to the firms to enhance their performance.…”
Section: Board Independencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the other hand, empirical results indicate that the volume of the board of directors does not have a statistically significant effect on innovation capability. The results obtained from the analysis are in parallel with those obtained by Driver and Guedes (2012), Shapiro et al (2015), Balsmeier et al, (2017) and Blibech and Berraies (2018).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 72%
“…The proportion of foreign members in the board of directors has a statistically significant effect on the sustainable innovation capabilities of enterprises. Tribo et al (2007), Mat Rabi et al (2010, Choi et al (2012), Minetti et al (2015), Shapiro et al (2015), Bobillo et al (2017) and Blibech and Berraies (2018) examined the effects of various administrative elements on innovation performance. Unlike these studies, in this study, the impact of board elements on innovation ability was investigated.…”
Section: H4mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Various researchers proposed enterprises should separate the functions of the chief executive officer and chairperson. In line with this perspective, Blibech and Berraies (2018) argued that the separation of the managerial roles enable enterprises to be able to control business decisions made by executives and reduces the inconsistency related to agency problems. The combination of the roles likely allows executives to be easy to support for their proposed projects although they do not make any profits for the enterprises (Fama & Jensen, 1983).…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%