The ideal free distribution: A review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective

Křivan, Vlastimil; Cressman, Ross; Schneider, Candace

doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2007.12.009

Cited by 165 publications

(171 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Typically these models only consider a small range of options for the players involved, for example to attempt to steal or not (Crowe et al, 2009;Broom et al, , 2014, or play Hawk or Dove in a contest Broom et al (2009);Grundman et al (2009). Such a discrete set of options is commonly considered in wider ecological scenarios, for example patch foraging, where the choice may be to forage on a particular patch (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970;Křivan et al, 2008). In many real situations, individuals will have a greater flexibility of options, for example forage for a while and then move to a different patch (Charnov, 1976).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

2014

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model for a specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a fight for concave cost functions, but for convex functions the scrounger obtains the resource (albeit at some cost). Permanent repository link

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

2014

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“…Thus in foraging models, the value of food patches depends directly on the intensity of their use by foragers within the population, as we saw from (Parker, 1978). More recent and realistic models of this phenomenon are given in Cressman et al (2004); Křivan et al (2008) for example.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games

Broom

Rychtář

2016

Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Abstract Classical evolutionary game theory has typically considered populations within which randomly selected pairs of individuals play games against each other, and the resulting payoff functions are linear. These simple functions have led to a number of pleasing results for the dynamic theory, the static theory of evolutionarily stable strategies, and the relationship between them. We discuss such games, together with a basic introduction to evolutionary game theory, in Section 1. Realistic populations, however, will generally not have these nice properties, and the payoffs will be nonlinear. In Section 2 we discuss various ways in which nonlinearity can appear in evolutionary games, including pairwise games with strategy-dependent interaction rates, and playing the field games, where payoffs depend upon the entire population composition, and not on individual games. In Section 3 we consider multiplayer games, where payoffs are the result of interactions between groups of size greater than two, which again leads to nonlinearity, and a breakdown of some of the classical results of Section 1. Finally in Section 4 we summarise and discuss the previous sections. Permanent repository link

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“…These conflicting goals give rise to a spatial game that has been termed a space race (Sih 2005). Studies of space race games and other habitat selection games, have derived evolutionary stable distributions and investigated whether or not density-dependent movements lead to such distributions (Iwasa 1982;Cressman et al 2004;Schreiber and Vejdani 2006;Abrams 2007;Krivan et al 2008). Studies of the effects of space races on large scale population dynamics have focused on the Lotka-Volterra predatorprey model and the Nicholson-Bailey host-parasitoid model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Population-level consequences of heterospecific density-dependent movements in predator–prey systems

Sjödin

Brännström

Söderquist

et al. 2014

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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In this paper we elucidate how small-scale movements, such as those associated with searching for food and avoiding predators, affect the stability of predator-prey dynamics. We investigate an individual-based Lotka-Volterra model with density dependent movement, in which the predator and prey populations live in a very large number of coupled patches. The rates at which individuals leave patches depend on the local densities of heterospecifics, giving rise to one reaction norm for each of the two species. Movement rates are assumed to be much faster than demographics rates. A spatial structure of predators and prey emerges which affects the global population dynamics. We derive a criterion which reveals how demographic stability depends on the relationships between the per capita covariance and densities of predators and prey. Specifically, we establish that a positive relationship with prey density and a negative relationship with predator density tend to be stabilizing. On a more mechanistic level we show how these relationships are linked to the movement reaction norms of predators and prey. Numerical results show that these findings hold both for local and global movements, i.e., both when migration is biased towards neighboring patches and when all patches are reached with equal probability.

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The ideal free distribution: A review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective

Cited by 165 publications

References 64 publications

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games

Population-level consequences of heterospecific density-dependent movements in predator–prey systems

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