The <i>Mafiya</i> and the New Russia

Galeotti, Mark

doi:10.1111/1467-8497.00029

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…44 The official figure for mafiya membership, 20,000 to 25,000, is almost certainly understated: other sources suggest the number is closer to 120,000. 45 Furthermore, this figure reflects only active members of the mafiya: the true numbers of people involved may be as high as three million. 46 Russian organized crime is a series of networks encompassing criminals, businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, security and military personnel, who between them are more than capable of moving stolen fissile material without Western intelligence forces ever being aware of the fact.…”

Section: The Sellersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

Cameron

1999

Nuclear Terrorism

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been at least one case where a fissile material component of a weapon was stolen and then recovered. 6 Furthermore, there is a huge quantity of nuclear materials, dispersed throughout Russia, that is even less secure. Reliable estimates put the Russian inventory at between 150 and 165 metric tonnes of weapons grade plutonium, and 1000 and 1300 metric tonnes of enriched uranium. 7 However, no one really knows what quantities are involved because, during the Cold War, Soviet facilities were set production targets. When these were exceeded, material was kept aside, rather than declared, so as to compensate for any shortfalls in subsequent targets. 8 Consequently, such facilities were more concerned with producing as much nuclear material as possible, rather than keeping an accurate record of existing stocks. Furthermore, material was counted in ruble value, rather than in weight, and inventories could be off by several tons. 9 Obviously, this poses immense problems of accounting, and the danger is heightened by poor security, especially at nuclear sites, secret cities and research institutes. The problem stems, at least in part, from the fact that, in the Soviet Union, nuclear security was dependent on it being a closed state, with strict controls over foreign travel by its citizens; internal security within the state was tight, discipline was rigidly enforced when controls were violated, and there was simply no black market for nuclear materials. Personnel were screened and closely supervised by members of the security services. Usually, nuclear material could be accessed only by a three man team: two technicians and a member of the security services.

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Section: The Sellersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

Cameron

1999

Nuclear Terrorism

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“…These may include: the level and type of physical security controls; the structures of opportunity and incentives that occur to organised crime groups (which may involve the development of illicit quasi-markets such as in drugs and counterfeiting and the development of legal economic opportunities such as the night time economy and construction); and the capacity of important social actors such as political/paramilitary groups to take advantage of these opportunity structures, i.e. the specific pattern of rules/resources which these groups may feature which may effect their ability for action (for Russia see Kalachev, 1996;Frisby, 1998;Galeotti, 1994Galeotti, , 1998 for South Africa see Shaw, 1996).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Paramilitaries, ‘ordinary decent criminals’ and the development of organised crime following the Belfast agreement

Moran

2004

International Journal of the Sociology of Law

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“…In Jamshedpur, one can usefully talk of the profitable relationship between capital and violence, which, in the context of newly liberalised post socialist economies, Vadim Volkov has termed the 'enforcement partnership' (Volkov 2002). In Volkov's context rather than acting as an obstacle to the 'market' (see Galeotti 1998), violent entrepreneurs effectively underwrite the fragile contracts of emerging capitalism through the threat of physical harm (Varese 2005;Volkov 2002). The environment is marked by rapidly expanding opportunity in large scale industry, coupled with corrupted state authority.…”

Section: The Decline Of a Company Town: Discourses Of Institutional Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capitalism, Violence and The State

Sanchez

2010

Journal of Legal Anthropology

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In the Tata company town of Jamshedpur, incisive popular discourses of corruption posit a mutually beneficial relationship between ‘legitimate’ institutions and organised criminality, a dynamic believed to enable pervasive transformations in the city’s industrial and financial infrastructures. This article situates this local discourse within the wider body of anthropological work on South Asian corruption, noting a discursive departure from the hegemonic, personalised and essentially provincialising corruption models encountered by many researchers. The article interrogates the popular model of crime and corruption in Jamshedpur through a focus upon the business practices of local violent entrepreneurs, exploring the extent to which their negotiations with corrupt institutions and ‘legitimate’ capital may indeed inform their successes. Drawing analytic cues from material on organised crime in the former USSR, this article identifies a mutually beneficial relationship between political influence, violence and industrial capital in an Indian company town.

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The Mafiya and the New Russia

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

Paramilitaries, ‘ordinary decent criminals’ and the development of organised crime following the Belfast agreement

Capitalism, Violence and The State

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