The Human Agent in Evolutionary Economics

Vromen, Jack

doi:10.4337/9781843762942.00017

Cited by 27 publications

(25 citation statements)

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“…There can be no 'uncaused cause'. However, the fact that intentions are somehow caused or determined does not mean that human agency is any less substantial or real (Vromen 2001). Human intentions are part of social reality and social interactions involve human expectations concerning the intentions of others.…”

Section: Darwinism Does Not Exclude Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 It is beyond the scope of this essay to probe compatibilism further. Among the many works on this topic see Sterba and Kourany (1981), Dennett (1984), Honderich (1993) and Vromen (2001). 13 On the compatibility of novelty with the principle of determinacy see Bunge (1959: Ch.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…8). Vromen (2001) rightly argues that evolutionary theory cannot be rejected on the grounds that it fails to predict novelty. Much of that which is described as novelty is unpredictable by any theory.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Darwinism, causality and the social sciences

Hodgson

2004

Journal of Economic Methodology

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Recently the degree to which 'evolutionary economics' does or should involve Darwinian principles has come under debate. This essay builds on previous arguments that Darwinism has a potentially wide application to socioeconomic evolution, which does not involve biological reductionism. It is argued that at the core of Darwinism are presuppositions concerning causality and causal explanation. Contrary to widespread belief, these presuppositions do not downgrade or ignore human intentionality: they simply require that it too is in principle subject to causal explanation. Neither are these presuppositions 'deterministic' or 'mechanistic', at least by some prominent meanings of these terms. Furthermore, the presupposition of causal determination does not necessarily exclude or include stochastic or probabilistic determination.

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Section: Darwinism Does Not Exclude Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Darwinism, causality and the social sciences

Hodgson

2004

Journal of Economic Methodology

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“…The individual remains much of a black box, as Nelson and Winter (1982) make clear, since, for their purposes, it is not necessary to dig deeper into individual persons, that is, their character, and to know more about their preferences and beliefs (cf. also Vromen 2001). Nelson and Winter (1982) emphasize that heterogeneous agents affect economic development and institutional change.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agents of change

Gerschlager

2011

J Evol Econ

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Evolutionary accounts in economics have offered a new look at economic development. Advancing on the limited cognitive capacities, they have shown that structural change follows technological, institutional and ideological paths. The present examination suggests an add-on to this cognitive portrayal of change. Drawing on Schumpeter's theory of innovation and Adam Smith's theory of knowledge, it analyzes human motives as important drivers of development. It brings in the dynamic nature of human motives and particularly discusses the human will as a requirement of change.

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“…For this reason, a consideration of the evolved cognitive dispositions of humans is helpful for a sound understanding of economic behavior (see, e.g., Vromen 2001). It will be shown that these cognitive dispositions have implications for notions of fairness and moral judgments, which in turn have far-reaching influences on human behavior in a socio-economic context.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract

Cordes

Schubert²

2006

Constit Polit Econ

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This paper delivers a step toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract. While mainstream social contract theory is based on an original position model that is defined in an aprioristic way, we endogenize its key elements, i.e., develop them out of the individuals' moral common sense. Therefore, the biological and social basis of moral intuitions are explored. In this context, a key adaptation during evolution was the one that enabled humans to understand conspecifics as intentional agents. Since these behavioral aspects are considered to be an exaptation, they are not amenable to direct genetic explanations or to rationalitybased approaches.

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The Human Agent in Evolutionary Economics

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

Darwinism, causality and the social sciences

Darwinism, causality and the social sciences

Agents of change

Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract

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