The Hole Argument Against Everything

Norton, Joshua

doi:10.1007/s10701-019-00258-y

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Finally, in "The Hole Argument Against Everything," Joshua Norton [25] contends that there is something deeply wrong with the reasoning involved in the hole argument. Consider: what the hole argument is claimed to establish is that there are some (putative) facts accepted by the substantivalist-namely, facts about at what spacetime point certain events occur-that are not determined by general relativity; from this, Earman and Norton conclude that to accept those facts leads to the unacceptable conclusion that the universe is indetermistic, and thus we should deny them.…”

Section: Issues Of Determinismmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Perspectives on the Hole Argument

Roberts

Weatherall

2020

Found Phys

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Section: Issues Of Determinismmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Perspectives on the Hole Argument

Roberts

Weatherall

2020

Found Phys

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“…(Newton 1687(Newton /1999 According to Newton, though we can only ever measure the relative position and velocities of bodies, these bodies, nonetheless, have absolute positions and velocities in absolute spacetime. Likewise, despite the diffeomorphism invariance of GR many philosophers of GR have included spacetime points as part of the theory's ontology (Butterfield 1989, Maudlin 1990, Brighouse 1994, Norton 2019. For instance, in the face of the diffeomorphism invariance of GR, "sophisticated substantivalists" have tossed out the assumed primitive identity of spacetime points rather than tossing out the points themselves (Maidens 1992, Hoefer 1996.…”

Section: Diffeomorphism Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Loop quantum ontology: Spacetime and spin-networks

Norton

2020

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in

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It is standardly claimed in loop quantum gravity (LQG) that spacetime both disappears, fundamentally, and emerges from spin-networks in the low energy regime. In this paper, I critically explore these claims and develop a variety of substantival and relational interpretations of LQG for which these claims are false. According to most of the interpretations I consider, including the "received interpretation", it is in fact false that spacetime emerges from spin-networks. In the process of supporting these claims, I also explain why spacetime is thought to be missing from the theory's fundamental ontology and demonstrate how this conclusion depends on our interpretation of the theory. In fact, I will argue that for a variety of interpretations spacetime survives quantization just as the electromagnetic field survives quantization. The upshot of the following analysis is a much needed clarification of the ontology of LQG and how it relates, or fails to relate, to the spacetime of general relativity.

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“…Implicitly, his later pointcoincidence argument (Einstein 1916) was his own reply to his Hole Argument (Norton 1993;Giovanelli 2021). See Stachel (2014), Norton (2019), Pooley (2022), and Gomes and Butterfield (2023a), and references therein for reviews of the Hole Argument in both a historical and a modern context.…”

Section: Research 1 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%