The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars

Rothenberg, Gunther E.

doi:10.2307/1986561

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These o¢ cial numbers, therefore, re ‡ect an upper bound of the size of Austrian-Hungarian forces. We identi…ed estimates of Austrian-Hungarian forces for 1809 and 1813 in Rothenberg (1973). The latter number indicates the high point of Austrian-Hungarian mobilization during the Napoleonic Wars and should also be treated as an o¢ cial, possibly in ‡ated estimate.…”

Section: Austria-hungary 1600-1918mentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

Onorato

Scheve²,

Stasavage

2014

J. Econ. Hist.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

War and the extent of mass mobilization for war has a signi…cant impact on a wide variety of economic and political development outcomes. In this paper, we investigate to what extent technological change has in ‡uenced the choice by governments to …eld mass armies. Focusing on a sample of thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000 we argue that changes in transport and communications technology were the single most important factor that ushered in the era of the mass army and subsequently led to its demise. During the nineteenth century the development of the railroad made it possible for the …rst time to mobilize and feed armies numbering in the millions. During the late twentieth century further advances in transport and communications technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision, making mass armies less desirable. We …nd strong support for our technological interpretation using a new data set that measures army size, population mobilization, and methods of recruitment from the beginning of the seventeenth century. In so doing we also consider several other plausible determinants of military mobilization. Contrary to what is often suggested by scholars, we …nd little evidence that the French Revolution and the invention of the concept of "the nation in arms" was associated with a substantial increase in levels of mobilization across nations. Even for the French case alone, the magnitude of what is sometimes referred to as the "Napoleonic watershed" was smaller than what is often believed.

show abstract

Section: Austria-hungary 1600-1918mentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

Onorato

Scheve²,

Stasavage

2014

J. Econ. Hist.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…147 With Saxony -counting 20,000 troops -as its sole ally, the Hohenzollern monarchy went to war in 1806 with an army of 245,000 men, half of them foreign mercenaries, and a field army of only 140,000, once Anton Wilhelm von L'Estocq's defensive contingent in East Prussia and garrison and depot troops were deducted. 148 The Napoleonic army, re-formed in the years of relative peace between 1801 and 1803, consisted of 265 infantry battalions, 322 cavalry squadrons, and 202 batteries of artillery, or about 300,000 men, supplemented by 63,000 troops from the states of the Rheinbund. 149 The idea that Prussia could take me on single-handed is too absurd to merit discussion … She will go on acting as she has acted -arming today, disarming tomorrow, standing by, sword in hand, while the battle is fought, and then making terms with the victor.…”

Section: The Levée En Masse and Conscriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…160 Prussia's 270,000-280,000 mobilized troops in 1813 were added to those of Russia, Austria, and other allies to create a combined force of about 800,000 or 570,000 in the field, compared with 600,000 in the French-led 'army of the nations', of whom 410,000 could be used in battle. 161 Not only did such levies give the Coalition an overall numerical advantage for the first time since 1792, they also altered the individual armies and changed soldiers' experiences of warfare, with more than one in four adult males in Prussia sent into the field in 1813 alone.…”

Section: The Levée En Masse and Conscriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Princes’ Wars, Wars of the People, or Total War? Mass Armies and the Question of a Military Revolution in Germany, 1792–1815

Hewitson

2013

War in History

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article investigates whether a military revolution took place in the German lands during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, with the potential to transform institutions and to alter contemporaries' attitudes not merely to war, but to politics and diplomacy. The scholarly debate about a metamorphosis of warfare during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods involves three connected controversies: the meaning and timing of any 'revolution' in the conduct of war, the existence of a 'total war' in or after 1792, and the continuation of 'cabinet warfare' by the majority of the German states. Recently, historians have argued that the geographical and political diversity of the German states, in conjunction with popular criticism of the burdens and sacrifices of conflict in southern and western Germany, militated against a broad military revolution. This study contends that such reactions were themselves indicative of the transformation wrought by the conscription of more mobile and destructive mass armies in a seemingly unending series of wars, which ensured that military conflicts impinged more fully on civilian life.

show abstract

“…These o¢ cial numbers, therefore, re ‡ect an upper bound of the size of Austrian-Hungarian forces. We identi…ed estimates of Austrian-Hungarian forces for 1809 and 1813 in Rothenberg (1973). The later number indicates the high point of Austrian-Hungarian mobilization during the Napoleonic Wars and should also be treated as an o¢ cial, possibly in ‡ated estimate.…”

Section: Austria-hungary 1600-1918mentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We provide the …rst systematic examination of the determinants of military mobilization over the very long run. Focusing on a sample of thirteen great powers between 1600 and 2000 we argue that changes in transport and communications technology were the single most important factor in both ushering in the era of the mass army and in leading to its eventual demise. During the nineteenth century the development of the railroad made it possible for the …rst time to mobilize and feed armies numbering in the millions. During the late twentieth century further advances in transport and communications technology made it possible to deliver explosive force from a distance and with precision. This development has made mass armies less relevant. We …nd strong support for our technological interpretation using a new data set that measures army size, population mobilization, and methods of recruitment from the beginning of the seventeenth century. In so doing we also consider several other plausible determinants of military mobilization. Contrary to what is so often suggested by political scientists, we …nd little evidence that the French Revolution and the invention of the concept of "the nation in arms" was associated with a substantial increase in levels of mobilization across nations. Even for the French case alone, the magnitude of what is sometimes referred to as the "Napoleonic watershed" was smaller than what is often believed.

show abstract

The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

Princes’ Wars, Wars of the People, or Total War? Mass Armies and the Question of a Military Revolution in Germany, 1792–1815

Technology and the Era of the Mass Army

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About