The Growth and Decline of Chinese Family Clans

Fei, John C. H.; Liu, Ts'ui-Jung

doi:10.2307/203266

Cited by 35 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…Finally, this paper contributes to the literature employing Chinese genealogies as a source of data (Liu 1978, 1980, 1992, Fei and Liu 1982, Telford 1986. While as I discuss below genealogies have certain limitations compared to high-income country census data (Harrell 1987, Telford 1990, Zhao 1994, the possibility of linking multiple generations is a key advantage, especially on questions where long-run dynamics could be important, such as the inter-generational transmission of human capital (discussed below).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

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Human capital and fertility in Chinese clans before modern growth

Shiue

2017

J Econ Growth

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A stylized fact of modern growth is that as countries become richer, education levels rise while family size decreases. This paper provides evidence that well before the onset of modern growth, changes in the return to education affected household choice of children's quantity versus quality. The setting is in Anhui Province, China over the 13th to 20th centuries. I show that the civil service examination system underwent long-term changes affecting the return to education, providing a means to test whether incentives for acquiring education affected fertility decisions. Employing an intergenerationally-linked dataset drawn from over 43,000 individuals, I first show that as the state examination's discretionary practices had been largely eliminated by the 17th century, increasing the return to education, households with a lower number of children had a higher chance that one of their sons would substantially invest into human capital. Second, I demonstrate that this negative relationship between fertility and education disappeared with a fall in the return to education due to the deterioration of the state examination system in the 19th century. Taken together, my findings provide support for the hypothesis that fertility choices respond to changes in the return to human capital. The implications of these findings for theories of economic development are discussed. and Stanford University Hoover Institution and also NBER carol.shiue@colorado.edu exclusively, or even predominately, on this route. For much of the history of the civil service examination system, other channels of advancements co-existed with it. For example, during the Ming (1368-1644) the purchase of offices and titles, and discretionary appointments were very common channels of entering the elite group of high-ranking officials.By the time of the reign of the first Qing emperor Shun-zhi (1644-1661) the civil service examination system had become the predominate pathway to elite status, attaining its final form which is today most typically associated with the institution. While certain degrees were offered for purchase at one time or another, and especially during times of revenue deficit, such as during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), these degrees were given different names. The higher-rank degrees that would allow the holder to obtain significant titled positions were much more exclusive than the purchased titles and moreover indicated the holder had passed the national examinations (Ho 1962). One reason why previous and more discretionary channels of entering officialdom became less common for the Han Chinese may have been that the Qing emperors, who were ethnically Manchu rulers, were concerned with establishing legitimacy of the new dynasty and control over local elites. Thus, in the early Qing, the examination system was the primary channel of gaining political influence and high social status.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…The Tongcheng genealogies are not unique in the length of the period covered;Fei and Liu (1982), for example, examine ten lineages over the period of 1400 to 1900.43 Surveys of the content and scope of Chinese genealogies includeLiu (1978Liu ( , 1980 andTelford (1986).…”

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confidence: 99%

Human capital and fertility in Chinese clans before modern growth

Shiue

2017

J Econ Growth

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“…During the urban expansion in China that started around year 1000 clan structures remained important, while in Europe during the same period of urbanization (between the eleventh and the mid-fourteenth centuries) the organizing roles of kinship structures declined. According to Fei and Liu (1982) the clan survived as an important Chinese institution also in the twentieth century.…”

Section: Cities As Milieus Of Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cities as development drivers: from waste problems to energy recovery and climate change mitigation

et al. 2011

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There is a strong connection between economic growth and development of cities. Economic growth tends to stimulate city growth, and city economies have often shaped innovative environments that in turn support economic growth. Simultaneously, social and environmental problems related to city growth can be serious threats to the realization of the socio-economic contributions that cities can make. However, as a result of considerable diversity of competences combined with interactive learning and innovation, cities may also solve these problems. The 'urban order' may form a platform for innovative problem solving and potential spill-over effects, which may stimulate further economic growth and development. This paper discusses how waste problems of cities can be transformed to become part of new, more sustainable solutions. Two cases are explored: Aalborg in Denmark and Malmö in Sweden. It is shown that the cities have the potential to significantly contribute to a more sustainable development through increased material recycling and energy recovery. Waste prevention may increase this potential. For example, instead of constituting 3% of the total greenhouse gas emission problem, it seems possible for modern European cities to contribute to greenhouse gas emission reduction by 15% through up to date technology and integrated waste management systems for material and energy recovery. Going from being part of the problem to providing solutions; however, is not an easy endeavour. It requires political will and leadership, supportive regulatory frameworks, realistic timetables/roadmaps, and a diverse set of stakeholders that can provide the right creative and innovative mix to make it possible.

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“…In addition, those with sufficient means often maintained large households, either in the form of a 'stem' or an extended family. A stem family included parents and at least one married son and his family and averaged ten people (Fei and Liu 1982). The extended family encompassed members of several families related through the male line.…”

Section: Social Structuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?

Greif

İyigün

Sasson³

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. ABSTRACT Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?We analyze the role of risk-sharing institutions in transitions to modern economies. Transitions requires individual-level risk-taking in pursuing productivity-enhancing activities including using and developing new knowledge. Individual-level, idiosyncratic risk implies that distinct risk-sharing institutions -even those providing the same level of insurance -can lead to different growth trajectories if they differently motivate risk-taking. Historically, risk sharing institutions were selected based on their cultural and institutional compatibility and not their unforeseen growth implications. We simulate our growth model incorporating England's and China's distinct pre-modern risk-sharing institutions. The model predicts a transition in England and not China even with equal levels of risk sharing. Under the clan-based Chinese institution, the relatively risk-averse elders had more control over technological choices implying lower risk-taking. Focusing on non-market institutions expands on previous growththeoretic models to highlight that transitions can transpire even in the absence of exogenous productivity shocks or time-dependent state variables. Recognizing the role of non-market institutions in the growth process bridges the view that transitions are due to luck and the view that transitions are inevitable. Transitions transpire when 'luck' creates the conditions under which economic agents find it beneficial to make the choices leading to positive rates of technological change. Luck came in the form of historical processes leading to risk-sharing institutions whose unintended consequences encouraged productivity-enhancing risk-taking. JEL Classification:O10, O31, O43, N10

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The Growth and Decline of Chinese Family Clans

Cited by 35 publications

References 0 publications

Human capital and fertility in Chinese clans before modern growth

Human capital and fertility in Chinese clans before modern growth

Cities as development drivers: from waste problems to energy recovery and climate change mitigation

Risk, Institutions and Growth: Why England and Not China?

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