The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion

White, Lawrence J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1091531

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 94 publications

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“…This is chronicled in White (, ). Kwoka and White (, and earlier editions) have provided seven editions of antitrust case studies that have been written by economists who were involved in major antitrust cases.…”

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confidence: 97%

Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity?

White

2019

Economic Inquiry

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The lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation—as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust/competition policy and litigation—has at least three causes: a considerably shorter period of intellectual development; the specific historical origins and culture of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where this disparity is especially noticeable; and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies. This paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications—including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics. (JEL B12, B13, B21, D18, L41)

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confidence: 97%

Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity?

White

2019

Economic Inquiry

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“…a közgazdasági megfontolások térnyerésének következtében azonban az 1970-es évek végétől az ügyek egyre nagyobb részében olyan döntések születtek, amelyek a korábbi per se tiltás helyett a mérlegelést tették szabállyá (árukapcsolás, területi kizárólagosságot kimondó szerződések, viszonteladói ár stb.). mára az egyesült államokban a per se tiltások körében csak a kőkemény (árrögzítő, piacfelosztó) kartellek maradtak (White [2010] 39-41. o., Gavil [2010] 838-840. o., Markham [2012.…”

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Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban

Valentiny¹

2019

Közgazdasági Szemle

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Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásbanAz elmúlt években a jogalkalmazási közgazdaságtan (forensic economics) megkapta a közgazdasági szakmai körökben hivatalos elismerésnek számító JEL-kódot.A tanulmány e szakterület fogalma tisztázásának szándékával bemutatja a piac-és vállalatelmélet fejlődését és jogalkalmazáshoz való viszonyának változásait. A verseny-és ágazati szabályozásban használt vizsgálatokat, eljárásokat követve felvázolja a jog és közgazdaságtan, a jogászok és közgazdászok közötti kapcsolatokat, végül állást foglal abban a kérdésben, hogy létezik-e jogalkalmazási közgazdaságtan.

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“…The experience in the antitrust review of mergers is that merger‐dependent efficiencies are always easy to promise but may well be more difficult to deliver. See the discussion of this point in White (2008).…”

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confidence: 99%

Wal‐mart and Banks: Should the Twain Meet? A Principles‐based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of Banking and Commerce

White¹

2009

Contemporary Economic Policy

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"The application in July 2005 by Wal-Mart to obtain a specialized bank charter from the state of Utah and to obtain federal deposit insurance reopened a national debate concerning the separation of banking and commerce. Though Wal-Mart withdrew its application in March 2007, the issue and the debate continue. This article offers a principles-based approach to this issue that begins with the recognition that banks are special and that safety and soundness regulation of banks is therefore warranted. Building on that recognition, the article lays out the principle that the "examinability and supervisability" of an activity should determine if that activity should be undertaken by a bank. Even if an otherwise legitimate activity is not suitable for a bank, it should be allowed for a bank's owners (whether the owners are individuals or a holding company), so long as the financial transactions between the bank and its owners are closely monitored by bank regulators. The implications of this set of ideas for the Wal-Mart case and for banking and commerce generally are then discussed". ("JEL" G21, G28) Copyright (c) 2009 Western Economic Association International.

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The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion

Cited by 11 publications

References 94 publications

Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity?

Antitrust Economics and Consumer Protection Economics in Policy and Litigation: Why the Disparity?

Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban

Wal‐mart and Banks: Should the Twain Meet? A Principles‐based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of Banking and Commerce

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