The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited

Cowan, Steven B.

doi:10.1017/s0034412502006352

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…This means that there is no possible world where both can exist. 4 Mackie adds two other premises to show the contradiction: -A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can‖ and -There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.‖ 5 One can modify the latter premise to -An omnipotent thing can do anything that is metaphysically possible including prevent evil.‖ 6 If both propositions are true, it follows that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent being would prevent all evils (since it could and would want to). Thus, it would be impossible that both evil and such a being exists.…”

Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Choo¹,

Goh²

2019

IJTPS

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Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant freedom is not intrinsically valuable, then Plantinga's reply to the logical problem of evil fails. In this paper, we assess three contemporary solutions to the dilemma above. The first is the love solution, which proposes that significant freedom is necessary for agents to love, and loving others is intrinsically good. The second is the soul-making solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for selfdeveloping one's moral character, and having a self-developed moral character is intrinsically good. The third is the derivative free will solution, which argues that significant freedom is necessary for derivative free will in heaven, and derivative free will is intrinsically good. We raise problems against all three solutions and instead defend a fourth solutionthe ultimate responsibility solution. That is, SF is instrumentally valuable as it gives agents ultimate responsibility with regards to morally significant acts. Finally, we defend the ultimate responsibility solution against two major objections.

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Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

“…And if the lack of [SF] No. 4 Now, a theist may try to escape the problem by suggesting that it is valuable for us to have SF but not valuable for God to have SF. After all, God is a different kind of being from humans.…”

Section: Significant Freedom God and The Redeemed In Heavenmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Choo¹,

Goh²

2019

IJTPS

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“…According to the grounding objection, in order for CCFs to be true, they must be true in virtue of some categorical aspect of the world. But, so the objection goes, there is no such aspect to ground their truth (Adams 1977;Hasker 1989: 29-52;Cowan 2003). The objection relies on a grounding principle that excludes the grounding of CCFs.…”

Section: Ccfs and Free Creaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While Molinism is perceived to have a number of fruitful applications in the philosophy of religion and theology, 2 it has been simultaneously plagued with a number of philosophical difficulties due to its commitment to true CCFs. Specifically, anti-Molinists argue that true CCFs do not exist because there is nothing to ground such truths (Adams 1977;Hasker 1989: 29-52;Cowan 2003), 3 or because they are ruled out by Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals (van Inwagen 1997). 4 Anti-Molinists have also argued that true CCFs are incompatible with libertarian freedom (Hasker 1986).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Counterfactuals of divine freedom

Cohen

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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Contrary to the commonly held position of Luis de Molina, Thomas Flint and others, I argue that counterfactuals of divine freedom (CDFs) are pre-volitional for God within the Molinist framework. That is, CDFs are not true even partly in virtue of some act of God's will. As a result, I argue that the Molinist God fails to satisfy an epistemic openness requirement for rational deliberation, and thus she cannot rationally deliberate about which world to actualize.

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“…Also see his (). Others who endorse a version of it include Hasker (, 29–31), Hunt (), Cowan (), Davison (), and Fales ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Recent Work on Molinism

Perszyk

2013

Philosophy Compass

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Molinism is named after Luis de Molina (1535Molina ( -1600. Molina and his fellow Jesuits became entangled in a fierce debate over issues involving the doctrine of divine providence, which is a picture of how God runs the world. Molinism reemerged in the 1970s after Alvin Plantinga unwittingly assumed it in his Free Will Defense against the 'Logical' Argument from Evil. Molinism has been the subject of vigorous debate in analytic philosophy of religion ever since. The main aim of this essay is to survey the main contours of this debate. We will visit some 'old' battlefields and current hot spots in the ongoing Molinism Wars.

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The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will

Counterfactuals of divine freedom

Recent Work on Molinism

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