2003
DOI: 10.1017/s0034412502006352
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The grounding objection to middle knowledge revisited

Abstract: The Molinist doctrine that God has middle knowledge requires that God knows the truth-values of counterfactuals of freedom, propositions about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. A well-known objection to middle knowledge, the grounding objection, contends that counterfactuals of freedom have no truth-value because there is no fact to the matter as to what an agent with libertarian freedom would do in counterfactual circumstances. Molinists, however, have offered responses to the grounding… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…This means that there is no possible world where both can exist. 4 Mackie adds two other premises to show the contradiction: -A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can‖ and -There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.‖ 5 One can modify the latter premise to -An omnipotent thing can do anything that is metaphysically possible including prevent evil.‖ 6 If both propositions are true, it follows that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent being would prevent all evils (since it could and would want to). Thus, it would be impossible that both evil and such a being exists.…”
Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This means that there is no possible world where both can exist. 4 Mackie adds two other premises to show the contradiction: -A good thing eliminates evil as far as it can‖ and -There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.‖ 5 One can modify the latter premise to -An omnipotent thing can do anything that is metaphysically possible including prevent evil.‖ 6 If both propositions are true, it follows that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent being would prevent all evils (since it could and would want to). Thus, it would be impossible that both evil and such a being exists.…”
Section: The Problem Of Evil and The Free Will Defensementioning
confidence: 99%
“…And if the lack of [SF] No. 4 Now, a theist may try to escape the problem by suggesting that it is valuable for us to have SF but not valuable for God to have SF. After all, God is a different kind of being from humans.…”
Section: Significant Freedom God and The Redeemed In Heavenmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the grounding objection, in order for CCFs to be true, they must be true in virtue of some categorical aspect of the world. But, so the objection goes, there is no such aspect to ground their truth (Adams 1977;Hasker 1989: 29-52;Cowan 2003). The objection relies on a grounding principle that excludes the grounding of CCFs.…”
Section: Ccfs and Free Creaturesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While Molinism is perceived to have a number of fruitful applications in the philosophy of religion and theology, 2 it has been simultaneously plagued with a number of philosophical difficulties due to its commitment to true CCFs. Specifically, anti-Molinists argue that true CCFs do not exist because there is nothing to ground such truths (Adams 1977;Hasker 1989: 29-52;Cowan 2003), 3 or because they are ruled out by Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals (van Inwagen 1997). 4 Anti-Molinists have also argued that true CCFs are incompatible with libertarian freedom (Hasker 1986).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also see his (). Others who endorse a version of it include Hasker (, 29–31), Hunt (), Cowan (), Davison (), and Fales ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%