The government's subsidy strategy of carbon-sink fishery based on evolutionary game

Effects of shared governance and cost redistribution on air pollution control: a study of game theory–based cooperation

“…Different from the existing game theory studies, this study first focuses on the cost redistribution on air pollution control. By applying the threshold effect-adjusted game model, this study extends the literature (Zara et al 2006;Sumaila et al 2009;Wei et al 2010;Madani 2010;Shi et al 2016;Fathi and Bakhshoodeh 2021;Gu et al 2022;Zheng and Yu 2022) by proposing cost-effective, socially acceptable, and administrative-feasible cooperation strategies of PM2.5 mitigation to internalize the environmental externalities equitably as well as cost-effectively. This study is among the first to revise the nonlinear programming by threshold effects to better fit the true cost curve of fine particulate abatement based on cities from metropolitan areas, as well as estimate further numerical costs and potential benefits from shared governance.…”

“…Game theory is generally employed to study governance or pollution control since Kilgour et al ( 1988 ). Scholars have explored the pollution control of transboundary river basin (Shi et al 2016 ), the energy subsidy (Fathi and Bakhshoodeh 2021 ), the subsidy strategy of carbon-sink fishery (Zheng and Yu 2022 ), the behavioral game of additional supervision (Gu et al 2022 ), and so on. Different from the existing game theory studies, this study first focuses on the cost redistribution on air pollution control.…”

“…Gu et al ( 2022 ) proposed an evolutionary game model of government and enterprises controlled by a third party. Zheng and Yu ( 2022 ) studied the subsidy strategy of carbon-sink fishery by a three-party evolutionary game model of fishermen, consumers, and the government. Cost redistribution on air pollution control is the essential question of shared governance, but previous research did not pay attention to it.…”

Stability analysis of evolutionary dynamics of 2 × 2 × 2 asymmetric games

“…For instance, discussion on policies to promote the development of a low-carbon economy, i.e. carbon emission trading [25][26][27] and carbon-sink fishery [28,29], supply chain problem analysis [30,31], environmental mass incidents [32], elderly care [33,34], etc. Besides, asymmetric evolutionary games have been also used to discuss the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas [35][36][37], and seeking the reasons for the existence of cooperation in dilemmas is a research hotspot in evolutionary game theory.…”

Factors influencing the farmer's chemical fertilizer reduction behavior from the perspective of farmer differentiation

“…Numerous studies have shown that governments implementing financial subsidies and other forms of support can compensate for the potential loss of profit from reductions [ 10 ] and subsequently stimulate reduction behavior [ 11 ]. However, studies have also shown that government subsidies are a non-market-based, universal behavioral incentive [ 12 ], which can only have a short-term effect and cannot fundamentally change the production habits of farmers [ 13 ]. Once government subsidies cease, farmers will carry out agricultural production according to the pre-subsidy fertilizer use [ 14 ].…”