2006
DOI: 10.1177/0899764006289765
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The Governance of Nonprofit Organizations: Empirical Evidence From Nongovernmental Development Organizations in Spain

Abstract: To verify the existence and relevance of control mechanisms that impede the expropriation of resources by the managers of nonprofits and that improve efficiency, we use a representative sample of Spanish nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs). The authors study how the donors’ structure and board of trustees relates to organizational efficiency. Results show that the presence of an active institutional donor provides a control mechanism for these NGDOs, thus favoring the efficient allocation of reso… Show more

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Cited by 66 publications
(48 citation statements)
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“…Other studies tease out the impact of particular board constituencies on resource development or organizational performance. For example, Jegers (2009) found that donor representation on nonprofit boards tends to reduce administrative costs, Callen et al (2003) found that major donor representation on nonprofit boards increases organizational efficiency, and Andres- Alonso et al (2006), in a study of nongovernmental development organizations in Spain, found that active institutional donor representation on governing boards increased organizational efficiency as well. Alternatively, Le Roux (2009) found that government funding mediates paternalistic tendencies of private donors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Other studies tease out the impact of particular board constituencies on resource development or organizational performance. For example, Jegers (2009) found that donor representation on nonprofit boards tends to reduce administrative costs, Callen et al (2003) found that major donor representation on nonprofit boards increases organizational efficiency, and Andres- Alonso et al (2006), in a study of nongovernmental development organizations in Spain, found that active institutional donor representation on governing boards increased organizational efficiency as well. Alternatively, Le Roux (2009) found that government funding mediates paternalistic tendencies of private donors.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Given these important studies and the existence of various theoretical models that deal with the governance of CSOs, the field is methodologically mature (Edmondson and McManus 2007). Nevertheless, past research in the field is mostly limited to qualitative, descriptive studies of different aspects of governance and structure and only very few quantitative empirical studies are available (Andrés-Alonso et al 2006;Iecovich 2005a). Quantitative studies can yield important contributions to the field by providing an empirical overview of the sector which is equally valuable for practitioners and researchers, testing the hypotheses gained by the qualitative endeavors and by determining on which factors governance attributes depend in practice.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet the government's "stamp of approval" may be particularly effective in inducing private donations if private leadership giving is hard to find, e.g., when the required seed money is more than any private donor can possibly afford to pay. 10 See also Khanna and Sandler (2000) as well as Andrés-Alonso et al (2006). 11 Examples include Okten and Weisbrod (2000), Khanna and Sandler (2000), and Heutel (2009). 2012b).…”
Section: H1: Even Though Donors May Regard Fundraising As Wasteful Pmentioning
confidence: 99%