The Governance and Disclosure of the Firm as an Enterprise Entity

Biondi, Yuri

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1440871

Cited by 14 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(2 reference statements)

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“…the re-definition of shareholder function as investors (not entrepreneurs), moving from the proprietor entrepreneur to the black box (Biondi, 2013); b. the re-definition of share buy-backs as having consequences for corporate control rather than being mere cash-based;…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, our material reveals the existence of three distinct standpoints on the role of the shareholders of the listed corporation: (i) take risk and receive cash, (ii) take risk adjusted for current controlling shareholder and receive cash, and (iii) take risk, control and receive cash. The first one corresponds to what Biondi (2013) calls the 'black box perception of the firm', the foundation for shareholder value thinking; while the third could be compared to the 'proprietor entrepreneur perception of the firm' (Biondi, 2013), a view based on a sole owner. The second standpoint, held by local institutional investors, is a mix of the first and third, more of a black-box with a clearly visible head.…”

Section: Look Upon Swedish Investment Like All Other Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Increasingly, the perception of the shareholder as the 'owner' of the firm, a perception embedded in the mainstream ideology of corporate governance, is being questioned (see e. g. Biondi, 2013;Ireland, 1999;Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000;Veldman, 2013;Weinstein, 2012). Instead, alternative conceptions have been promoted that distinguish the enterprise as a production entity from its legal form and view the shareholder as 'merely' owners of shares.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Instead, alternative conceptions have been promoted that distinguish the enterprise as a production entity from its legal form and view the shareholder as 'merely' owners of shares. Common to most of this research is the notion that the 'shareholder value revolution' (Biondi, 2013) or the 'shareholder primacy doctrine' (Weinstein, 2012), reflects the influence of strong political and economic interests and has been supported by mainstream research. To focus on this process, is also to acknowledge that real world changes are carried out by actors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the shareholder value doctrine, the shareholders are assumed to be homogenous (Biondi, 2013;Weinstein, 2012). Herein 'the good owners' are defined as investors, skilled in evaluating investment opportunities, whose objective is to maximize the cash flow from their investments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Doxa of Shareholders and Owners: On the Threshold of Financialization

Jonnergård

Larsson-Olaison

2017

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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Abstract:Following financialization, there has emerged an understanding of what it implies to be a shareholder based on the shareholder value perception. However, as this shareholder value perception spreads internationally, it clashes with traditional perceptions. In this paper, we apply the language developed by Bourdieu to a Swedish public debate on equal treatment of shareholders in connection with the reform of the Swedish market for corporate control. Using Bourdieu's conceptual framework, we describe how a global development interacts with the persistence of national practices. We conclude that in Sweden, local institutional investors have allied themselves with international institutional investors to enhance their positions in the restricted field of Swedish corporate control. Shareholder value is then used by these local actors as an argument to strengthen their position. At the same time, some of the controlling shareholders depart from their traditional position as industrial entrepreneurs and embrace a more financial approach to ownership, thereby altering both the power constellations and the capital, in Bourdieu's sense, of the field.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Look Upon Swedish Investment Like All Other Investmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Doxa of Shareholders and Owners: On the Threshold of Financialization

Jonnergård

Larsson-Olaison

2017

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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Politics of Intra-firm Trade: Corporate Price Planning and the Double Role of the Arm’s Length Principle

Ylönen

Teivainen

2017

New Political Economy

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Intra-firm trade is an emerging issue. One of its key elements is the international shifting of profits, for example, through transfer pricing that big enterprises use to cross-subsidise their subsidiaries, often to avoid taxes. Accounting rules conceal much of the information about transfer pricing, reproducing secrecy and facilitating the use of administered prices. Given the prevalence of administered price setting, a significant amount of international trade cannot be meaningfully analysed as market transactions. This provokes questions about the validity of market assumptions in research on trade in particular and global capitalism more generally. Our specific contribution focuses on the role of the arm's length principle and the significance of cross-subsidisation and other forms of corporate planning in intra-firm trade. Under certain conditions, price planning by private corporations should be analysed as political rule within the economic sphere. Since the politics of the world economy is not merely related to governmental intervention, corporations should also be theorised as potentially political entities. Crossing the disciplinary boundaries between political economy and normative political theory, we suggest that the politicisation of intra-firm trade opens possibilities for creating more effective responses to price administration and for creating more democratic ways of governing the global economy.ARTICLE HISTORY

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