2018
DOI: 10.1007/s11116-017-9853-4
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The Gothenburg congestion charges: cost–benefit analysis and distribution effects

Abstract: This paper performs an ex-post cost-benefit and distribution analysis of the Gothenburg congestion charges introduced in 2013, based on observed effects and an ex-post evaluated transport model. Although Gothenburg is a small city with congestion limited to the highway junctions, the congestion charge scheme is socially beneficial, generating a net surplus of €20 million per year. From a financial perspective, the investment cost was repaid in slightly more than a year and, from a social surplus perspective, i… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
(34 reference statements)
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“…In Gothenburg a similar cordon-based congestion charge was introduced in 2013. The observed traffic reduction across the cordon was 10% on average [ 16 ]. For simplicity, the effect of the congestion taxes is represented by an overall reduction in traffic flow within the modelling areas of 21% and 10% for Stockholm and Gothenburg, respectively.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Gothenburg a similar cordon-based congestion charge was introduced in 2013. The observed traffic reduction across the cordon was 10% on average [ 16 ]. For simplicity, the effect of the congestion taxes is represented by an overall reduction in traffic flow within the modelling areas of 21% and 10% for Stockholm and Gothenburg, respectively.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Eliasson (2016) found that low-income earners pay a substantially larger share of their income in congestion charges in Gothenburg than in Stockholm. West and Börjesson (2020) showed that net social benefits were positive, although redistribution from car users to the government was considerably larger than the net benefit. The welfare effects of this redistribution were found to be regressive.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…86 Policy levers are often distributed across multiple levels of government. Overall, the political process can be Eliasson and Hamilton, 2016[227]; West and Borjesson, 2020 [178]), Milan (Ozer, Beria and Pacchi, 2012 [245]), Norway (Tretvik, 2003[237]; Odeck and Kjerkreit, 2010 [246]); Edinburgh (Gaunt, Rye and Allen, 2007 [259]), The Netherlands (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2006 [236]), The Canary Islands (Grisolía, López and de Dios Ortúzar, 2015 [255]), the United States (Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001[253]; Zmud, 2008[232]), Sydney (Hensher and Li, 2013[35]) and Taiwan (Jou, Lam and Wuvs, 2007[249]). 85 De Borger and Proost (2012 [277]) show that the ex-ante opposition to tolls can be explained by uncertainties on (i) the availability of alternatives to driving and (ii) the use of toll revenue.…”
Section: Political Economy Of Road Pricing and Other Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%