The good, the bad, and the timely: how temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection

Reuter, Kevin; Kirfel, Lara; Riel, Raphael van; Barlassina, Luca

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01336

Cited by 22 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 22 publications

(37 reference statements)

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“…These results confirm previous studies that show that the violation of a norm is a stronger trigger for attributing blame than the moral status of the outcome (Reuter et al, 2014). A 2 x 2 ANOVA with Action and Outcome as independent factors, and participant's rating as dependent measure was carried out.…”

Section: Unbeknownst Tosupporting

confidence: 76%

Is there really an omission effect?

Willemsen

Reuter

2016

Philosophical Psychology

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Section: Unbeknownst Tosupporting

confidence: 76%

Is there really an omission effect?

Willemsen

Reuter

2016

Philosophical Psychology

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“…A second related study made a valuable contribution to the current work already, in providing a framework for the vignettes in Experiment 2 (Reuter et al, 2014). In the original study, they examined the role of norm violations and temporal order in causal selection.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Importantly, rather than using a rating scale, Reuter et al (2014) had their participants make a forced choice between the two agents in the scenario. They found that the agent who violated a norm was more likely to be selected as the cause, and indeed this is compatible with the causal superseding effect, but it does not distinguish whether the varied actor was seen as more causal or whether the fixed actor was seen as less causal.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Causal superseding

et al. 2015

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When agents violate norms, they are typically judged to be more of a cause of resulting outcomes. In this paper, we suggest that norm violations also affect the causality attributed to other agents, a phenomenon we refer to as "causal superseding." We propose and test a counterfactual reasoning model of this phenomenon in four experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 provide an initial demonstration of the causal superseding effect and distinguish it from previously studied effects. Experiment 3 shows that this causal superseding effect is dependent on a particular event structure, following a prediction of our counterfactual model. Experiment 4 demonstrates that causal superseding can occur with violation of non-moral norms. We propose a model of the superseding effect based on the idea of counterfactual sufficiency.

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“…While we will focus on these two accounts here, it should be noted that these are not the only two plausible explanations in the literature nor are they the only two worth discussing. Just a few notable examples are the work ofAlicke 1992, Cushman 2013, Malle et al 2014, and Reuter et al 2014 …”

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confidence: 99%

Causal Attributions and Corpus Analysis

Sytsma¹,

Bluhm²,

Willemsen³

et al. 2019

Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy

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Although philosophers have often held that causation is a purely descriptive notion, a growing body of experimental work on ordinary causal attributions using questionnaire methods indicates that it is heavily influenced by normative information. These results have been the subject of sceptical challenges. Additionally, those who find the results compelling have disagreed about how best to explain them. In this chapter, we help resolve these debates by using a new set of tools to investigate ordinary causal attributions-the methods of corpus linguistics. We apply both more qualitative corpus analysis techniques and the more purely quantitative methods of distributional semantics to four target questions: (a) Can corpus analysis provide independent support for the thesis that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to normative information? (b) Does the evidence coming from corpus analysis support the contention that outcome valence matters for ordinary causal attributions? (c) Are ordinary causal attributions similar to responsibility attributions? (d) Are causal attributions of philosophers different from causal attributions we find in corpora of more ordinary language? We argue that the results of our analyses support a positive answer to each of these questions. causal statement, in contrast, describes the relation between two event tokens, such as 'Peter's smoking caused his lung cancer' or 'Jenny's throwing the rock caused the window to break'. For both general and actual causation, most philosophers assume that the concept of causation is a purely descriptive notion, refering to a relation in the world. As a consequence, a causal attribution such as 'A caused B' is true if and only if the relation of causation holds between A and B. Such an understanding of causation, however, means that normative considerations are irrelevant to causal attributions. The basic idea here is that whether or not an action is permitted by morality or convention simply does not matter for purposes of assessing whether that action, or the entity carrying it out, caused the outcome. Similarly, whether an action causes a morally good or bad outcome is irrelevant for causal considerations. Call this the standard view on causation. Against the standard view, a growing body of empirical findings indicates that ordinary causal attributions are sensitive to normative information, prominently including injunctive norms

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The good, the bad, and the timely: how temporal order and moral judgment influence causal selection

Cited by 22 publications

References 22 publications

Is there really an omission effect?

Is there really an omission effect?

Causal superseding

Causal Attributions and Corpus Analysis

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