The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789

Middlekauff, Robert

doi:10.2307/365319

Cited by 24 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…In the American Revolution, this group corresponds to the Sons of Liberty (Maier 1972), and during the Revolutionary War, perhaps a subset of regulars who remained with the Continental Army during the toughest times. Middlekauff's (2005) description is telling: "By winter 1779-1780 the Continentals were beginning to believe that they had no one save themselves to lean on.... Dissatisfaction in these months slowly turned into a feeling of martyrdom.…”

Section: Leadership: Inspiring Regime Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“…These features, which are more conducive to generate selective material rewards, are less available in less militarized conflicts.3 Such motivations may seem implausible to some today. However, asMiddlekauff (2005) puts it in his history of the American Revolution, "Courage, honor, gallantry in service of liberty, all those words calculated to bring a blush of embarrassment to jaded twentieth-century men, defined manhood for the eighteenth century" (p. 515).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Inspiring Regime Change

Morris¹,

Shadmehr

2023

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We consider the problem of a leader who can assign rewards for citizens for different anti-regime actions. Citizens face a coordination problem in which each citizen has a private, endogenous degree of optimism about the likelihood of regime change. Because more optimistic citizens are easier to motivate, the choice of optimal rewards entails optimal screening. This leads to a distribution of anti-regime actions. A key result is the emergence of a vanguard, consisting of citizens who engage in the endogenous, maximum level of action. Other citizens participate at varying degrees, with less optimistic citizens contributing less. We explore how the regime’s strength or the maximum reward available to the leader influence the distribution of actions. Moreover, we show that more heterogeneity (e.g., higher inequality) among potential revolutionaries reduces the likelihood of regime change. Our methodological contribution is that we deliver a sharp and novel marriage of screening and global games.

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Section: Leadership: Inspiring Regime Changementioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%