The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy

Attig, Najah; Boubakri, Narjess; Ghoul, Sadok El; Guedhami, Omrane

doi:10.1111/fima.12115

Cited by 115 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…In the same context, Attig et al . () show that family firms pay lower dividends and are more likely to decrease/cut dividends, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesessupporting

confidence: 73%

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms

Boubaker

Nguyên

Rouatbi

2016

Eur Financial Management

119

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We investigate the role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in corporate risk‐taking. Using a sample of publicly listed French family firms over the period 2003−2012, we show that the presence, number and voting power of MLS are associated with higher risk‐taking. Our results suggest that MLS help restrain the propensity of family owners to undertake low‐risk investments. This effect is much stronger in firms that are more susceptible to agency conflicts. The results highlight the important governance role played by MLS in family firms and may explain why MLS are associated with higher firm performance.

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“…In the same context, Attig et al . () show that family firms pay lower dividends and are more likely to decrease/cut dividends, consistent with the expropriation hypothesis.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesessupporting

confidence: 73%

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms

Boubaker

Nguyên

Rouatbi

2016

Eur Financial Management

119

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“…Following Attig, Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Guedhami (), we set DPO = 1 when DIVIDEND > NET INCOME , and = 0 for negative NET INCOME and still find similar results.…”

mentioning

confidence: 76%

Dividend policy and bank opacity

Tran

Ashraf

2018

Int. J Fin Econ

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Does dividend policy increase or decrease bank opaqueness? Under the Dividend–Transparency Channel, paying dividends involves banks having greater discipline from the markets due to external financing and reduces private benefits of control, leading to lower earnings management concerns. Under the Dividend–Opacity Channel, due to a hesitancy to change dividend policy, banks have high vocations to engage earnings management to circumvent payout policy restrictions in debt covenants or to keep their dividend target unchanged. Employing a large sample of 2,483 U.S. bank holding companies from 2001:Q1–2013:Q4, the study documents the double‐edged sword of dividends on the discretionary behaviours of banks. Paying dividends makes banks less opaque to compare with nonpayers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Transparency Channel, however among dividend paying banks, excessive dividends involve banks to manage more their numbers, which is consistent with the Dividend–Opacity Channel. The findings are robust under different specifications. The results are of important interest to bank regulators.

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“…Institutional environments weaken the role of gender diversity on dividend policy, and relationship between gender diversity and dividend policy is strong when females have ownership in a firm. Attig et al (2016) The findings suggests that family ownership has a negative impact on the dividend policies of firms. Benjamin and Biswas (2017) The results suggest that board gender diversity has a positive impact on the dividend policies of firms, but that the positive relationship only exists in the firms without CEO duality.…”

Section: Ye Et Al (2019)mentioning

confidence: 98%

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

Mustafa

Saeed

Awais

et al. 2020

JRFM

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In eras of intense debates on the appointment of women on corporate boards, this research sheds light on the structure of board in Asian emerging economies by examining how women on board of family businesses separately and collectively affect the dividend announcement of business organizations. On the basis of the panel data of four Asian emerging economies—China, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India—for the period 2010–2018, the results from our Tobit regression showed the adverse (negative) and significant impact of women on boards and in family businesses upon dividend announcement. It is important that policymakers should not view firms with one eye. There should be a spillover on board gender diversity from international to domestic levels, and international firms should be set as an example for domestic firms for the inclusion of women on boards. It might be the best time for Asian emerging economies to take productive action for balancing the gender in boardroom settings, and to set a minimum mass of women on boards for better and more effective decision making.

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The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy

Cited by 115 publications

References 67 publications

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk-taking: Evidence from French Family Firms

Dividend policy and bank opacity

Board-Gender Diversity, Family Ownership, and Dividend Announcement: Evidence from Asian Emerging Economies

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