The Ghent system in transition: unions’ evolving role in Sweden’s multi-pillar unemployment benefit system

Abstract

This article discusses the multi-faceted and changing role played by trade unions in providing unemployment benefits in Sweden, a country using the so-called Ghent system. As an important institutional feature explaining the high rate of unionisation in the Nordics, the system has been much debated. This article provides a comprehensive account of the retrenchment of the state unemployment benefit system (UBS) and the development of occupational and private UBS pillars providing complementary protection. It also introduces an ongoing reform discussion where the social partners are proposed to govern the unemployment insurance system via collective agreements, while retaining the union-linked insurance funds. The core institutional feature of the Ghent system – voluntary membership of a union-linked insurance fund – is turning out to be highly resilient despite frequent attempts to weaken the union power stemming from it. However, the system’s role in providing unemployment protection has changed due to its development into a multi-pillar structure, meaning that its future prospects are uncertain.

Editorial and Introduction

“…Müller et al (2022) track this kind of ‘topping-up’ concerning JRSs in selected countries. In the Swedish case, as shown by Lindellee and Berglund (2022), there are several examples of collective agreements that include components of central concern for both employers and workers, such as training, employment protection, and top-ups of unemployment benefits. These measures carry the risk of reinforcing the insider/outsider divide on the labour market, however.…”

“…Les syndicats ont donc un intérêt économique à ce que les allocations de chômage soient généreuses, mais aussi un intérêt organisationnel à ce que les allocations de chômage soient décentes afin de conserver ou de recruter des membres. Comme Lindellee et Berglund (2022) le confirment dans leur article, dans les systèmes gantois, le lien entre le système d'allocations de chômage et le taux de syndicalisation est flagrant dans la mesure où l'octroi des allocations est lié à l'adhésion à un syndicat/une caisse. Dans les systèmes obligatoires, toutefois, comme l'illustre l'article de Clegg et al (2022), le fait de soutenir les intérêts des outsiders aide également les syndicats à contrecarrer l'incitation inhérente au système qui pousse les travailleurs à quitter le syndicat lorsqu'ils perdent leur emploi, ce qui permet de maintenir le nombre d'adhérents en période de crise économique.…”

“…In Ghent systems, in contrast, the unions are still more directly involved in the administration of the unemployment insurance system. Paradoxically, however, in those systems the state is the rule-setting authority for the subsidised unemployment fund, as a result of which unions lose a lot of influence on the design of the scheme, for instance as regards eligibility rules, replacement rate and so on (see Lindellee and Berglund, 2022). This dependency on the state was an important reason why unions in several countries were hesitant to get involved in Ghent systems in the first place (Rasmussen and Pontusson, 2018).…”

“…Dans les systèmes gantois, en revanche, les syndicats sont encore plus directement impliqués dans la gestion du système d'assurance chômage. Mais, paradoxalement, dans ces systèmes, l'État est l'autorité qui fixe les règles applicables à un fonds de chômage subventionné : les syndicats perdent ainsi beaucoup d'influence sur la conception du régime, par exemple en ce qui concerne les règles d'éligibilité, le taux de remplacement, etc., (voir Lindellee et Berglund, 2022). Cette dépendance à l'égard de l'État a été une raison importante pour laquelle, dans plusieurs pays, les syndicats ont d'abord hésité à s'impliquer dans les systèmes gantois (Rasmussen et Pontusson, 2018).…”

Unemployment benefit governance, trade unions and outsider protection in conservative welfare states

“…Here unemployment insurance is voluntary, heavily subsidised by the state and administered by trade union–affiliated funds. These institutional features combine to create strong incentives for joining trade unions, especially among labour market groups that are most exposed to the risk of unemployment (for a detailed discussion, see Clasen and Viebrock, 2008; Lindellee and Berglund, 2022). Most obviously this boosts trade union density, the classic measure of trade union power resources (Korpi, 1983).…”