The German Federal Constitutional Court’s Exercise of Ultra Vires Review and the Possibility to Open an Infringement Action for the Commission

Abstract

The paper examines the possible opening of an infringement procedure against Germany as a result of the breaches that emerge from the declaration by the German Constitutional Court that the Court of Justice has acted ultra vires in the Weiss judgment (C-493/17). The proportionality assessment of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB), carried by the Court of Justice, is contested by the domestic court. We recall that the Commission enjoys great discretion regarding the launch of an infringement action based upon Article 258 of the TFEU and may be reluctant to use its powers, considering the special position of the constitutional courts in the context of Article 267 TFEU as well as the present situation of emergency following the pandemic. Yet, the possibility to start an infringement procedure for breaches of Treaty obligations resulting from an incorrect interpretation of domestic courts was admitted in case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy and applied in two subsequent cases (C-154/08 Commission v. Spain and C-416/17 Commission v. France). As a result of the ruling of May 5, 2020, the Court of Justice may find that Germany failed to fulfil obligations stemming from Article 267 TFEU and the related case-law, Article 19 TEU, as well as Article 5(2) TEU. Other breaches concern the independence of the ECB and of the Bundesbank (being it a Member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the Eurosystem) as defined in Articles 130, 282(3) TFEU and Article 7 of the Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. We argue in favour of the violation of all these provisions read in conjunction with the duty of loyal cooperation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU. Yet, we conclude that it is uncertain whether the Commission will open (or continue) an infringement procedure against Germany since the Bundesbank may act to satisfy the requests of the German Constitutional Court in relation to the proportionality of the PSPP. It is to be hoped that the German State organs will make sure that the PSPP may be continued, thus ensuring the functioning of the Eurozone, despite the attack of the BVerfG to the EU Judicature and to Weiss ruling in particular.

La primacía absoluta o relativa del derecho de la Unión Europea: recensión de doctrina académica sobre la jurisprudencia reciente de tribunales constitucionales

“…Más allá de las teorías generales que conceptualizan las tendencias actuales de resistencia, existe una extensa literatura que comenta el reciente asunto PSPP del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán (BVerfG) en relación con el caso Weiss del Tribunal de Justicia (Di Fabio, 2014: 107;Mayer, 2014: 111;Martín Rodríguez, 2020;Murswiek, 2014: 147;Bast, 2014: 167;Gärditz, 2014: 183;Kumm, 2014: 203;Schneider, 2014: 217;Thiele, 2014: 241;Goldmann, 2014: 265;Gerner-Beuerle et al, 2014: 281;Petersen, 2014: 321;Schiek, 2014: 329;Beukers, 2014: 343;Pliakos y Anagnostaras, 2014: 369;Pernice, 2014: 3;Wendel, 2014Wendel, : 263 y 2017Schriewer, 2014: 701;Galetta y Ziller, 2020 50 . Este fallo alemán ha recibido considerables críticas por parte de la doctrina jurídica de más peso que estudia el derecho de la UE (Poiares Maduro, 2020;Editorial Comments CMLR, 2020: 965;Egidy, 2021: 285;Mayer, 2020aMayer, y 2020bPetersen, 2020b;Poli y Cisotta, 2020;Sauer, 2020;y Wendel, 2020). Algunos han argumentado incluso que el tribunal federal alemán ha dañado gravemente no solo la estabilidad de la zona del euro (The Economist, 2020 y Fleming et al, 2020), sino también su propia autoridad y reputación en el diálogo judicial europeo (desde una perspectiva europea) (Weiler, 2020;Bobić y Dawson, 2020b: 1153y 1991Simon y Rathke, 2020).…”

Ultra Vires Odluke Suda Eu-A: Početak Sudskog Sukoba Ili Suradnje

“…32 S tim u vezi, mogao bi smatrati da ga nepriznavanjem njegovih presuda, nacionalni sudovi sprječavaju u izvršavanju njegovih ovlasti. 33 Moglo bi se i shvatiti da su države, konkretno njezini sudovi, povrijedili i načelo lojalne suradnje iz članka 4. stavka 3. UEU-a.…”

“…37 S druge strane, pokretanje postupka protiv države zbog odluke njezina najvišeg nacionalnog suda o ultra vires naravi odluke Suda EU-a nije nešto na što će se Unija lako odlučiti. 38 Takva reakcija znači otvoreni sukob s nacionalnim ustavnim ili drugim najvišim sudom, s vrlo upitnim ishodom u smislu eventualnih koristi. 39 Naime, malo je vjerojatno da će nacionalni sud države o kojoj je riječ reagirati izmjenom svoje odluke.…”