The Geography of Nuclear Proliferation Networks

Arms Supply and Proliferation Networks

“…The geography of ballistic missile proliferation networks, and perhaps even illicit small arms networks, ought to exhibit the same patterns that Hastings (2012) observes in the case of nuclear proliferation networks. However, compared to nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, a much smaller proportion of total illicit small arms trafficking activity is sponsored by states.…”

“…Proliferation and small arms networks are not simply social or political networks; they also areor are conjoined with-physical networks. These networks also contain multiple layers: the layer representing direct assistance between states looks very different from the layers involving, for example, middlemen who procure components, transporters who facilitate the movement of the components themselves (Hastings 2012), and brokers who arrange financing (Group d'action financiere 2008; Gruselle 2007). Each country's internal and external proliferation network differs depending on the political structures, international barriers, and other factors like active diasporas (Boureston and Russell 2009).…”

“…Those are the places where network hubs form. Hastings (2012) thus observes that when A. Q. Khan (as a semi-independent agent) 4 redirected his efforts to Libya's nuclear ambitions in the 1990s, he could no longer count on the resources of his home state. The network's primary hub formed in the United Arab Emirates, which attracts a large number of foreigners (and foreign companies) and whose geographic location and advanced port facilities accommodate a great deal of global commerce.…”

Going it alone: The causes and consequences of U.S. extraterritorial counterproliferation enforcement

“…Third, this ability to adapt is also reflected in their operation across multiple jurisdictions around the world. The evolving geography of these networks as they respond to different political, legal, regulatory, and enforcement environments has been noted (Hastings, 2012). While often sourcing technology from industry in advanced economies, these networks often conduct their operations in "third country" hubs to obscure the end user and avoid enforcement action (Salisbury, 2019).…”

An evolving state of play? Exploring competitive advantages of state assets in proliferation networks

“…9 Hastings's valuable work provides the most extensive discussion, and makes the most significant conceptual contribution, discussing the role of "coordinators" in proliferation networks that have access to "state prerogatives and resources". 10 He argues that coordinators that have access to these resources: …can avoid setting up logistical support structures that are embedded in potentially hostile countries, while their control of their own means of transportation allows them to bypass legitimate commercial transportation infrastructure when they move goods. 11 Through providing contrasting, historic and inter-related case studies of Pakistan's procurement network, which benefitted from use of state resources such as embassies, diplomatic personnel and military transport planes, and Khan's Libya and Iran networks, which had to rely on some commercial infrastructure, he argues that access to resources is the "most important factor" in determining the geography of proliferation networks.…”