The geographical pivot of history and early twentieth century geopolitical culture

Abstract

This article offers a re-interpretation of the geographical pivot of history by setting it in the context of the international relations and strategic debates of the early twentieth century, and by engaging with the historiography of British foreign policy during the Edwardian period. The overall argument is that the prospective effort of Mackinder does not appear as merely speculative but is in fact rather well grounded in the fundamentals of British foreign policy and more directly relevant than hitherto assumed. Identifying a trend towards a shift in the equilibrium between land power and sea power, Mackinder emphasized -and perhaps over-emphasized -a Russian threat to British interests but considered that Germany alone only posed a minor threat. Such analysis seems to be remarkably in tune with British geopolitical culture around 1904, and with the ideas of the British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. The way in which Mackinder further stressed that a combination of the two main continental powers would represent a major peril for Britain has hitherto been treated rather dismissively. This article however shows how twice during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 Wilhelm II attempted to bring such an alliance about. This article attempts to reassess the actual impact of the geographical pivot of history and more broadly of Mackinder's thought, usually considered minimal, on British foreign policy before 1914. Finally, a number of issues that seem to deserve further attention are suggested, in particular that of the influence exerted by Mackinder before 1914, and that of the genesis of Mackinder's conception of the 'pivot zone' or 'heartland'.

An Arendtian geopolitics: Action, power and the deferral of work

“…The ‘pivot’ was consonant with contemporary logics of international relations and Prime Minister Balfour’s ideas (Venier, 2004: 334–335) although subsequently its significance as geostrategy (rather than historical geography) has been overemphasised. It used locational advantages (of seas and continents) to explain British maritime power’s dominance.…”

A brief intellectual history of geopolitical thought and its relevance to the Baltic Sea region

“…The sea-oriented approaches to geopolitics are howeversimilar to the land-oriented approachesbiased in a number of ways. Above all, Mackinder's original vision appears to have been grounded in the foreign and defence priorities of the early twentieth century, more preoccupied with Russia than with Germany as an emerging contender on the world stage (Venier, 2004).This may help explain why his version of a sea-oriented approach heavily emphasizes the Eurasian landmass, the so-called "Heartland", and draws on a largely inflexible, spatialized understanding of (sea as well as land) territory. Mackinder's sea-oriented approach also assumes that power projection can only be met by proportionate countervailing power and that technological advantage virtually always is decisive in military combat.…”

The ‘Ornithologists’, the ‘Birds’, and the Meaning of the ‘Meaning of Europe’: Keynote Address to the EAHN on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary

“…In part, Mackinder's observations were triggered by the Russo-Japanese war, which was experienced with shock by all who could understand its implications, even if they could only frame that understanding in the regressive jargon of imperial political authenticity. Japan, a small island nation in Asia, was able to subdue Russia -one of the great modern empires and a member of the Concert of Europe -by leveraging technology and mechanization into force multipliers (Venier 2004 (Mackinder 1904: 422). 'From the present time forth … we shall have to deal with a closed political system', Mackinder argued.…”