The genetic and phylogenetic analysis of a highly pathogenic influenza A H5N6 virus from a heron, southern China, 2013

Luo, Kaijian; Zhang, Kai; Liu, Lu; Shen, Xuejuan; Jiao, Peirong; Song, Yafen; Lv, Jiamin; Wang, Mei; Liu, Yongfa; Qi, Wenbao; Ren, Tao; Irwin, David M.; Liao, Ming; Shen, Yongyi

doi:10.1016/j.meegid.2018.01.028

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…From 2010–2013, sporadic outbreaks caused by Gs/GD HPAI viruses continued to affect wild and domestic birds in Asia and Europe (Marchenko et al 2011, Marinova‐Petkova et al 2012, Sakoda et al 2012, Luo et al 2018). A specific viral lineage of Gs/GD HPAI viruses emerged during this time period, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses (Smith et al 2015).…”

Section: Emergence and Evolution Of Goose/guangdong Lineage Hpai Virusesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is an emerging disease threat to wild birds in North America

et al. 2022

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Prior to the emergence of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Gs/GD) H5N1 influenza A virus, the long‐held and well‐supported paradigm was that highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks were restricted to poultry, the result of cross‐species transmission of precursor viruses from wild aquatic birds that subsequently gained pathogenicity in domestic birds. Therefore, management agencies typically adopted a prevention, control, and eradication strategy that included strict biosecurity for domestic bird production, isolation of infected and exposed flocks, and prompt depopulation. In most cases, this strategy has proved sufficient for eradicating HPAI. Since 2002, this paradigm has been challenged with many detections of viral descendants of the Gs/GD lineage among wild birds, most of which have been associated with sporadic mortality events. Since the emergence and evolution of the genetically distinct clade 2.3.4.4 Gs/GD lineage HPAI viruses in approximately 2010, there have been further increases in the occurrence of HPAI in wild birds and geographic spread through migratory bird movement. A prominent example is the introduction of clade 2.3.4.4 Gs/GD HPAI viruses from East Asia to North America via migratory birds in autumn 2014 that ultimately led to the largest outbreak of HPAI in the history of the United States. Given the apparent maintenance of Gs/GD lineage HPAI viruses in a global avian reservoir; bidirectional virus exchange between wild and domestic birds facilitating the continued adaptation of Gs/GD HPAI viruses in wild bird hosts; the current frequency of HPAI outbreaks in wild birds globally, and particularly in Eurasia where Gs/GD HPAI viruses may now be enzootic; and ongoing dispersal of AI viruses from East Asia to North America via migratory birds, HPAI now represents an emerging disease threat to North American wildlife. This recent paradigm shift implies that management of HPAI in domestic birds alone may no longer be sufficient to eradicate HPAI viruses from a given country or region. Rather, agencies managing wild birds and their habitats may consider the development or adoption of mitigation strategies to minimize introductions to poultry, to reduce negative impacts on wild bird populations, and to diminish adverse effects to stakeholders using wildlife resources. The main objective of this review is, therefore, to provide information that will assist wildlife managers in developing mitigation strategies or approaches for dealing with outbreaks of Gs/GD HPAI in wild birds in the form of preparedness, surveillance, research, communications, and targeted management actions. Resultant outbreak response plans and actions may represent meaningful steps of wildlife managers toward the use of collaborative and multi‐jurisdictional One Health approaches when it comes to the detection, investigation, and mitigation of emerging viruses at the human‐domestic animal‐wildlife interface.

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Section: Emergence and Evolution Of Goose/guangdong Lineage Hpai Virusesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is an emerging disease threat to wild birds in North America

et al. 2022

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“…The viral ancestors to several groups of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses described herein are represented by the WHO CVV, A/Sichuan/26221/2014 (referred to as “group D” by Lee et al 16 and hereby A/Sichuan/26221/2014 group). This group of primarily A(H5N6) viruses were identified in China as early as 2010, 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 but have not been detected since 2015.…”

Section: Global Spread Of Hpai Clade 2344 A(h5) Virusesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses

Yamaji

Saad

Davis

et al. 2020

Reviews in Medical Virology

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Summary The panzootic caused by A/goose/Guangdong/1/96‐lineage highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses has occurred in multiple waves since 1996. From 2013 onwards, clade 2.3.4.4 viruses of subtypes A(H5N2), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) emerged to cause panzootic waves of unprecedented magnitude among avian species accompanied by severe losses to the poultry industry around the world. Clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses have expanded in distinct geographical and evolutionary pathways likely via long distance migratory bird dispersal onto several continents and by poultry trade among neighboring countries. Coupled with regional circulation, the viruses have evolved further by reassorting with local viruses. As of February 2019, there have been 23 cases of humans infected with clade 2.3.4.4 H5N6 viruses, 16 (70%) of which had fatal outcomes. To date, no HPAI A(H5) virus has caused sustainable human‐to‐human transmission. However, due to the lack of population immunity in humans and ongoing evolution of the virus, there is a continuing risk that clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses could cause an influenza pandemic if the ability to transmit efficiently among humans was gained. Therefore, multisectoral collaborations among the animal, environmental, and public health sectors are essential to conduct risk assessments and develop countermeasures to prevent disease and to control spread. In this article, we describe an assessment of the likelihood of clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses gaining human‐to‐human transmissibility and impact on human health should such human‐to‐human transmission occur. This structured analysis assessed properties of the virus, attributes of the human population, and ecology and epidemiology of these viruses in animal hosts.

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“…A retrospective study conducted in China confirmed that the A(H5N6) clade 2.3.4.4 had circulated in wild birds in southern China in 2013, the year of the first isolation of this subtype from poultry in the region (Luo et al, 2018). Lu et al (2018) reported the first case of detection of A(H5N6) in wild migratory birds sampled during active surveillance in western China at the end of 2015.…”

Section: Genetic Characterisationmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…A retrospective study conducted in China confirmed that the A(H5N6) clade 2.3.4.4 had circulated in wild birds in southern China in 2013, the year of the first isolation of this subtype from poultry in the region (Luo et al, 2018). A comprehensive whole-genome analysis of 89 A(H5N6) viruses detected in wild birds and poultry in Japan during the epidemic in winter 2016-2017 provided evidence for great genetic diversity exemplified by the existence of at least 5 genotypes (Takemae et al, 2017).…”

Section: Genetic Characterisationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Avian influenza overview November 2017 ‐ February 2018

Adlhoch¹,

Brouwer²,

Kuiken³

et al. 2018

EFS2

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Between 16 November 2017 and 15 February 2018, one highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N6) and five HPAI A(H5N8) outbreaks in poultry holdings, two HPAI A(H5N6) outbreaks in captive birds and 22 HPAI A(H5N6) wild bird events were reported within Europe. There is a lower incursion of HPAI A(H5N6) in poultry compared to HPAI A(H5N8). There is no evidence to date that HPAI A(H5N6) viruses circulating in Europe are associated with clades infecting humans. Clinical signs in ducks infected with HPAI A(H5N8) seemed to be decreasing, based on reports from Bulgaria. However, HPAI A(H5N8) is still present in Europe and is widespread in neighbouring areas. The majority of mortality events of wild birds from HPAIV A(H5) in this three‐month period involved single birds. This indicates that the investigation of events involving single dead birds of target species is important for comprehensive passive surveillance for HPAI A(H5). Moreover, 20 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) outbreaks were reported in three Member States. The risk of zoonotic transmission to the general public in Europe is considered to be very low. The first human case due to avian influenza A(H7N4) was notified in China underlining the threat that newly emerging avian influenza viruses pose for transmission to humans. Close monitoring is required of the situation in Africa and the Middle East with regards to HPAI A(H5N1) and A(H5N8). Uncontrolled spread of virus and subsequent further genetic evolution in regions geographically connected to Europe may increase uncertainty and risk for further dissemination of virus. The risk of HPAI introduction from Third countries via migratory wild birds to Europe is still considered much lower for wild birds crossing the southern borders compared to birds crossing the north‐eastern borders, whereas the introduction via trade is still very to extremely unlikely.

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The genetic and phylogenetic analysis of a highly pathogenic influenza A H5N6 virus from a heron, southern China, 2013

Cited by 6 publications

References 12 publications

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is an emerging disease threat to wild birds in North America

Highly pathogenic avian influenza is an emerging disease threat to wild birds in North America

Pandemic potential of highly pathogenic avian influenza clade 2.3.4.4 A(H5) viruses

Avian influenza overview November 2017 ‐ February 2018

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