The game of energy transition: A game theoretical perspective on public participation procedures in infrastructure planning

Abstract

For energy transition, infrastructure construction is often indispensable but also contested and potentially problematic for social cohesion. Through a game theoretical lens, we examine the basic configuration of infrastructure conflicts. Informed by the empirical example of German electricity grid planning, we discuss three approaches to resolve multilevel infrastructure conflicts, (1) technocratic decision‐making, (2) participatory decision‐making, and (3) redistribution and compensation, as well as the conditions under which we can expect them to mitigate conflicts. Each of the three approaches has been tried out in German grid planning over time, which allows us to analyze whether the respective conditions were met and why the approaches were (not) able to resolve existing conflicts. We demonstrate that enduring conflicts in German grid expansion are not caused by a fundamentally ill‐defined decision‐making procedure but rather by a particularly “wicked” conflict structure that can hardly be resolved within planning procedures.

Multilevel interdependencies and policy capacity in Europe

“…Obstacles to the implementation of fundamental reforms in Germany, such as the energy transition, have so far been attributed primarily to the specific institutional structures of German federalism (Behnke & Hegele, 2023). Ruffing and Brendler (2024) use a game-theoretical perspective to show that the conflicts over electricity grid planning in Germany are the result of a "wicked" problem structure. The challenge is that large transmission lines are beneficial on a macrosocial level, but only generate costs from a local perspective.…”