The Galileo bias: A naive conceptual belief that influences people's perceptions and performance in a ball-dropping task.

Abstract

This research introduces a new naive physics belief, the Galileo bias, whereby people ignore air resistance and falsely believe that all objects fall at the same rate. Survey results revealed that this bias is held by many and is surprisingly strongest for those with formal physics instruction. In 2 experiments, 98 participants dropped ball pairs varying in volume and/or mass from a height of 10 m, with the goal of both balls hitting the ground simultaneously. The majority of participants in both experiments adopted a single strategy consistent with the Galileo bias, showing no improvement across trials. Yet, for participants reporting intentions of dropping both balls at the same time, the differences between release points were significantly greater than 0 ms. These findings support separate but interacting cognition and perception-action systems.

Perceived object stability depends on shape and material properties

“…While there are numerous studies on naïve physics involving motion (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985;McCloskey, 1983), research dealing with air resistance is less common. Oberle et al (2005) found that even if participants are given appropriate feedback on the effects of air resistance on falling objects, there still exists a tendency to believe that objects will hit the ground at the same time, otherwise known as the 'Galileo bias.' It is theorized that the 'Galileo bias' results from constantly experiencing falling objects at short heights, where the rates of free fall are undistinguishable.…”

“…One variable that we did not consider in the present experiment is air resistance. It has remained unknown whether humans possess the knowledge of air resistance to influence their decisions or whether they inaccurately believe that gravity affects heavier objects more than lighter objects (Oberle et al, 2005). Furthermore, past research on representational momentum has also shown that participants believe heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects (Hubbard, 1997).…”

“…That is, heavier objects should fall faster since they are more affected by gravity, but in reality, lighter objects reach their terminal velocity quicker, where the speed at which the force of gravity equals the force due to air resistance, so heavier objects can reach a higher speed. However, it is uncertain as to whether participants inaccurately believe that heavier objects are more affected by gravity than lighter objects, or whether they lack the necessary knowledge of air resistance to help influence their judgments (Oberle et al, 2005).…”

Judgments about forces in described interactions between objects.

“…This is not meant to imply a claim that judgment and inference do not go on in perceptual processing; it is just a terminological convenience, to distinguish the kinds of explicit judgments made by participants in Jie present research from the reports of visual impressions made by participants in the studies by Wiite (2007Wiite ( , 2009). 980 WHITE There have been numerous studies of judgments about object motion (Hecht & Bertamini, 2000;Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001;Oberle, McBeath, Madigan, & Sugar, 2005; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2(K)5), but hardly any studies of judgments about forces in relation to object motion. This is odd, because all object motions refiect the operation of forces and because we frequently make judgments about forces, particularly in relation to interactions between objects.…”

Judgements about the relation between force and trajectory variables in verbally described ballistic projectile motion

“…This kind of dissociation between performance and explicit judgement, with less accuracy in the latter, has been found in numerous studies of object motion (Hecht & Bertamini, 2000;Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001;Oberle, McBeath, Madigan, & Sugar, 2005;Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005). It appears that the motor programmes that underlie performance do not communicate with the cognitive processes that generate explicit judgements (Goodale & Milner, 1992).…”