The Future of Biological Disarmament

Abstract

The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) gave the future of biological disarmament new hope. It brought the BWC back closer to the core of multilateral efforts to combat the weaponization of disease, agreed to an intersessional work program for 2007 Á2010, created an implementation support unit, and revived the interrupted process of BWC evolution through extended understandings agreed at review conferences. However, its aims were deliberately modest. Having set their sights realistically low, delegations did not have to lower them much further. What was most important was to prevent U.S.-Iranian acrimony from paralyzing the conference. With deadlock once again narrowly averted, the conference had to clear away the debris left from past dissensions in order to open the way to constructive evolution for the treaty. In particular the conference avoided contentious subjects such as permanent organization and verification measures for the BWC; its institutional deficit and compliance problems remain. Successes and limitations of the conference are analyzed, as is its equivocal outcome on confidence-building measures. Developing on the endogenous principle, the BWC will continue to need constant attention. At the center of a complex edifice, the BWC must be kept sound, strong, and solid.

Ambitious Incrementalism

“…35 Fragmentation suggests a weakening of the treaty and of the norm against bioweapons use following possible amendment of the BWC and potential withdrawal from it. Convergence implies recognition of the broader chemical and biological weapons spectrum and the development of coordinating mechanisms between the BWC, the wider biological weapons regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the broader framework of arms control, disarmament, and UN nonproliferation agreements.…”

“…Great care was taken to test the treaty's limits nondestructively, with regard both to US sensitivities and to the fragility of the politics within the treaty. 18 Indeed, the evolution of the BWC was possible only because sights were set so low, especially at the Sixth BWC Review Conference and at meetings during the second intersessional work program (2007Á2010).…”

“…31 One pressing issue ripe for a future working group is how to give state parties a regular opportunity to not only demonstrate their own compliance, but also to consider other states' performance of BWC obligations. 32 Another connected issue that should be addressed is how states might discuss each other's CBM returns and pool their experiences. The appropriate forum or framework for such transparency*organized in a spirit of cooperation (perhaps under Article V)*needs to be worked out during the next intersessional period, along with other medium-term issues.…”

Escaping the False Dilemma of Strategic Nuclear and Biological Deterrence

“…Indeed, as Nicholas Sims notes in making this point, from a disarmament perspective it is the nuclear sector which lags behind the international biological and chemical weapon treaties. 2 Furthermore, analysis of historical programmes as well as contemporary assessments of biological weapons clearly points to the conclusion that biological weapons are neither strategically, technically or ethically suitable replacements for existing nuclear stockpiles. This means that Dr Baum's approach is in no way reconcilable with the understandings of those who have critiqued his work publicly.…”