The Futility of Buffer Zones in International Politics

Abstract

Buffer zones as a concept have a long history. Despite their frequent occurrence in international relations past and present, however, they have been treated in passing by scholars and policymakers alike, and then usually from a purely historical perspective. Their importance in conflict management, third-party intervention and power politics are not adequately mirrored in scholarly research. This article seeks to remedy this lapse by reintroducing the buffer zone as a tool of international conflict management in a new and systematic fashion. In this article, we survey buffer zones, their conceptual roots and characteristics, and illustrate our theoretical findings with an array of different examples-predominantly from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In so doing, we make three fundamental arguments about buffer zones.

In-between spaces in the Levant: Conceptual reflections

“…The author underlined the importance of the geography of the third state (the buffer state) and the asymmetrical power relation for the buffer system to take place. More recently, Beehner and Meibauer (2016) highlighted several characteristics of the 'buffer zone' in the perspective of political action. Owing to its poor legal definition, a buffer zone has a 'strategic flexibility' that can be useful for both conflict management, like the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas, and offensive purposes, for example, when 'the other state failed to ascertain its monopoly on violence, in quasi-preemptive self-defense' (Beehner & Meibauer, 2016, p. 5).…”

Shifting Policies in Conflict Arenas: A Cosine Similarity and Text Mining Analysis of Turkey’s Syria Policy, 2012-2016

“…We have used the term safe haven." 48 50 is further reflected in cosine similarity results for 2014 where the cosine similarity for all terms is consistently high-an indication that Turkey's leaders were themselves confused by the terms and unsure as to which policies to pursue given the uncertainty of action by the US, the UN and others.…”

“…34 At this point in time, there were indications that at least some Turkish officials assessed the US, perhaps in concert with other NATO allies, would intervene militarily in Syria after the November 2012 US presidential elections. 35 Turkey also continued to play a visible if less-than-robust role in multi-party international negotiations. 36 Additionally, Turkey began to respond more forcefully to the Syrian army's border incursions and shelling.…”

Untitled

“…48 However, Numan Kurtulmus, the Deputy Prime Minister contradicted Davutoğlu, noting, "We [Turkey] want a no-fly zone and a buffer zone [in Syria]." 49 This semantic confusion, by no means confined to Turkey alone, 50 is further reflected in cosine similarity results for 2014 where the cosine similarity for all terms is consistently high-an indication that Turkey's leaders were themselves confused by the terms and unsure as to which policies to pursue given the uncertainty of action by the US, the UN and others.…”