The functions of “just kidding” in American English

Skalicky, Stephen; Berger, Cynthia M.; Bell, Nancy

doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.05.024

Cited by 26 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…The production of "just" within situated instances of talk-in-interaction has, however, received comparably little research (e.g. Sacks, [1967; Craig and Sanusi, 2000;Weltman, 2003;Goodman and Burke, 2010;Childs, 2012;Skalicky, Berger and Bell, 2015;Haugh, 2016). Indeed, whilst its minimising operation has been analysed in prior research (e.g.…”

Section: 'Just'mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Interactional Bind of “Just [Do X]”

Holmes

Toerien

Jackson

2017

Research on Language and Social Interaction

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This paper examines the use of "just"-formulated advisings in ordinary, naturally-occurring sequences of unsolicited advice-giving when produced in response to troubles-tellings. Drawing on two examples from our broader collection, we demonstrate that such advisings are employed in response to advice-resistance and function to minimise proposed courses of future action, attenuating their imposing nature. We show they place an interactional bind upon advice-recipients which contributes towards further resistance. This paper explicates this bind and its categorial, epistemic and moral implications. Data are in American and British English. In their seminal research on the rejection of advice, Jefferson and Lee (1980; 1981/1992) demonstrated that advice-giving is oriented to as a misaligned response to troubles-tellings, and routinely occasions resistance from troubles-tellers. They explain this resistance on categorial grounds; namely, if a troubles-teller were to accept advice from an interlocutor, this would proposedly transform their discourse identity from that of a "troubles-teller" to an "advice-recipient", substituting the categorial perquisites (e.g. entitlements, rights, obligations, etc.) that are normatively afforded by the incumbency of the former category with those associated with the latter. Likewise, the previously positioned "troubles-recipient" would proposedly transform their discourse identity to that of an "advice-giver", claiming the perquisites that are implicated, normatively, by the incumbency of the latter category. As Jefferson and Lee (1980; 1981/1992) observe, this disrupts the progressivity of the troublestelling. The previously positioned troubles-recipient hasby misaligning with their categorial positioning as suchinitiated a transformation of the interaction from a "troubles-telling" to a "service encounter", focusing off the troubles-teller and his/her experiences, and focusing on the trouble as a 'problem to be solved' (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 416). The production of advice-giving in response to a troubles-telling thus engenders 'interactional asynchrony' (Jefferson and Lee, 1981: 402), with interlocutors pursuing two diverging interactional trajectories. In this paper, we revisit the period of interactional misalignment to hone in on a peculiar feature that recurs in responses to advice resistance; namely, the delivery of "just"-formulated advisings. Examples of this practice include the following.

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Section: 'Just'mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Interactional Bind of “Just [Do X]”

Holmes

Toerien

Jackson

2017

Research on Language and Social Interaction

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“…While claims to non-serious intent can be made by speakers to acknowledge instances of failed humour or anticipate possible offence (Bell, 2015;Skalicky, Berger and Bell, 2015), in these cases, as we have seen, the mockery is interactionally achieved as jocular. The deployment of such expressions thus appears to be doing other kinds of interactional work, a point which we will return to discuss in further detail in section four.…”

Section: Jocular Mockerymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Yet no matter how the target(s) of the jocular mockery are interpreted by these participants, the subsequent claim by Tim to be "just kidding" (line 532), does not appear to be necessary for Paula to recognise or appreciate the humour here, given the design of the tease itself (lines 526-527), and their subsequent shared laughter (lines 528-531). Instead, the expression seems to primarily function here as a bid to return to a serious frame (Skalicky, Berger and Bell, 2015). This bid to move back to a serious frame is something which Paula appears to be orienting to through the incipient account in line 534 that is framed as non-straightforward through 'well'-prefacing (Heritage, 2015), but it is subsequently abandoned as they return to engaging in shared laughter (lines 534-537).…”

Section: Jocular Mockerymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Notably, then, the subsequent claim by Jeff to be "just kidding" (line 395), does not appear to be necessary for Jill to recognise or appreciate the humour here given her laughing responses in lines 389 and 392. Instead, the use of the expression appears to constitute a bid to close the teasing sequence and return to serious talk (Skalicky, Berger and Bell, 2015), a bid which this time is successful, as Jill goes on to ask what Jeff has been doing while she's been away (line 396). However, given it follows a po-faced rejection of tease in question it appears to constitute a possible instance of third position repair (Schegloff, 1992;Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977).…”

Section: Jocular Mockerymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He suggests that the 'joke-joke' expression can be used in teasing and overstatements to: (1) undertake repair, (2) disclaim and disaffiliate from one's immediately prior stance in order to retrospectively recontextualise it as ambiguously (non-)serious, and (3) to promote "mutual affiliation and agreement" (p.151). Skalicky, Berger and Bell (2015), on the hand, identified and coded four key functions of "just kidding" and related expressions, drawing from a corpus-assisted analysis of 1200 instances of such expressions in humorous interactions amongst American speakers of English. These included (1) "inoculation", the pre-emptive use of disclaimers to forestall negative reactions (2) "repair of failed humour" through "naming" the prior utterance as a joke subsequent to an attempt at humour or play not being recognised, understood, or appreciated, (3) making a bid to "return to serious", that is, a return to a serious or non-playful frame of talk subsequent to a joking sequence, and (4) "setting up new joke", that is, subverting the expectations of other participants through use of disclaimers to launch extensions of the previous joke (Skalicky, Berger and Bell 2015: 23-27).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Just kidding”: Teasing and claims to non-serious intent

Haugh

2016

Journal of Pragmatics

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The analysis of humour in interaction is often closely tied to the intentions of the producer in question. The notion of intent that is invoked in humour research generally involves a deontological construct, where issues of moral accountability come to the fore. In this paper, the role of claims to non-serious intent with respect to (ostensibly) jocular forms of teasing amongst speakers of English are examined in order to broaden our understanding of this deontological account of intent. Building on an analysis of the action-sequential environments in which claims to non-serious intent are made, a distinction is first made between two distinct teasing practices, jocular mockery and jocular pretence. These practices are revealed as distinct through the design of the tease itself (i.e. whether it is delivered as non-serious or serious), the sequential placement of laughter from recipients (i.e. whether it is contiguous with the tease or delayed), and what next action is made contingently relevant by a claim to non-serious intent (i.e. a return to serious talk or laughter). It is subsequently claimed that claims to non-serious intent are not only sequentially implicative, but morally implicative as well, given such claims revolve around the degree to which producers may be legitimately held accountable for the potentially serious implications of the tease in question, and the degree to which recipients are licensed to take offence. The moral work accomplished through claims to non-serious intent include preempting or blocking the taking of offence in response to the tease, acknowledging a possible impropriety, sanctioning a recipient for taking things too seriously, and disputing the appositeness of the claim to non-serious intent itself. It is concluded that claiming non-serious intent is sequentially and morally implicative, and so constitutes a situated social action in and of itself, and that an analysis of the interpersonal implications of teasing, including the interactional accomplishment of interpersonal evaluations, participant identities and relationships, requires careful attention be directed accordingly. The implications of this first order, discursive account of intent for technical, second accounts of cognition-for-interaction are also briefly considered.

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References

2021

Foundations of Familiar Language

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The functions of “just kidding” in American English

Cited by 26 publications

References 25 publications

The Interactional Bind of “Just [Do X]”

The Interactional Bind of “Just [Do X]”

“Just kidding”: Teasing and claims to non-serious intent

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