The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking: New Evidence, New Challenges, New Insights

Roese, Neal J.; Epstude, Kai

doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.02.001

Cited by 178 publications

(286 citation statements)

References 273 publications

(360 reference statements)

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“…When generating counterfactual thoughts, normality and controllability of the antecedents to the event influence the content of counterfactual thoughts (Olson et al, 2000). Roese and Epstude (2017) characterize the form of counterfactual thinking by direction (upward vs. downward), structure (addition of a new element not present in actuality [additive counterfactual] vs. deletion of an element that was present in actuality [subtractive counterfactual]), or social focus. By social focus the authors mean whether the counterfactual's element connects to oneself or another individual (i.e., internal vs. external locus of causation).…”

Section: Counterfactual Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparisons inform me who I am: A general comparative processing model of self-perception

Morina¹

2020

Preprint

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Our self-concept contributes to our sense of identity over time. Yet, self-perception is motivated and serves survival and thus does not reflect stable inner states or accurate biographical accounts. Literature indicates that different types of comparison standards act as reference frames in evaluating attributes that constitute the self. However, the role of comparisons in self-perception has been underestimated, arguably due to lack of a guiding framework that takes into account relevant aspects of comparison processes and their interdependence. I propose a general comparative model of self-perception that consists of a basic comparison process involving the individual's prior mental representation of the target dimension, the construal of the comparison standard, and the comparison outcome representing the posterior representation of the target dimension. The generated dimensional construal is then appraised with respect to one's motives and controllability and goes on to shape emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses. Contextual and personal factors influence the comparison process. This model may be informative in better understanding comparison processes in our everyday life as well as in designing interventions to assist people overcome undesirable consequences of comparative behavior. [182 words]

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Section: Counterfactual Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Secondly, the generated counterfactual alternative is compared to reality. Whereas many studies have examined counterfactual thinking (Roese & Epstude, 2017), there is lack of research on counterfactual comparison (Hoppen, Heinz-Fischer, & Morina, 2020).…”

Section: Counterfactual Comparisonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparisons inform me who I am: A general comparative processing model of self-perception

Morina¹

2020

Preprint

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“…People create counterfactuals very often in their everyday lives (e.g., De Brigard & Parikh, 2019; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Phillips, Morris, & Cushman, 2019; Roese & Epstude, 2017). A counterfactual such as “if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed” can seem to mean something very different from its factual counterpart, “if she watered the plants they bloomed.” The counterfactual conveys the known or presupposed facts that its antecedent is not the case, “she did not water the plants,” and its consequent is not the case either, “the plants did not bloom.” Determining the truth of a counterfactual presents a logical challenge for a truth‐functional account of conditionals—according to which a conditional is true if its antecedent is false or its consequent is true—because on such an account every counterfactual must be true, given that its antecedent is false (see Nickerson, 2015; see also Chisholm, 1946).…”

Section: Conditional Suppression and Counterfactual Elevationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

Espino

Byrne

2020

Cognitive Science

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We examine two competing effects of beliefs on conditional inferences. The suppression effect occurs for conditionals, for example, "if she watered the plants they bloomed," when beliefs about additional background conditions, for example, "if the sun shone they bloomed" decrease the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens (from "the plants did not bloom" to "therefore she did not water them"). In contrast, the counterfactual elevation effect occurs for counterfactual conditionals, for example, "if she had watered the plants they would have bloomed," when beliefs about the known or presupposed facts, "she did not water the plants and they did not bloom" increase the frequency of inferences such as modus tollens. We report six experiments that show that beliefs about additional conditions take precedence over beliefs about presupposed facts for counterfactuals. The modus tollens inference is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain additional conditions (Experiments 1a and 1b). The denial of the antecedent inference (from "she did not water the plants" to "therefore they did not bloom") is suppressed for counterfactuals that contain alternatives (Experiments 2a and 2b). We report a new "switched-suppression" effect for conditionals with negated components, for example, "if she had not watered the plants they would not have bloomed": modus tollens is suppressed by alternatives and denial of the antecedent by additional conditions, rather than vice versa (Experiments 3a and 3b). We discuss the implications of the results for alternative theories of conditional reasoning.

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“…In Step 2, the impetus catalyzes the PM experience by eliciting mentally simulated actions or behaviors that have a propensity to result in either desired or undesired outcomes (e.g., Kappes & Morewedge, ; Markman, Klein, & Suhr, ). The experiential (i.e., emotional, physical) states that arise from these simulated outcomes characterize the phenomenology of PM (see also Roese & Epstude, ; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, ; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, ). Finally, in Step 3, the PM experience cascades into multiple psychological, physiological, and behavioral responses that increase in quantity and intensity until the momentum sequence is interrupted.…”

Section: The Output‐centered Approach: Situating the Pm Experience Wimentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological momentum: The phenomenology of goal pursuit

Briki

Markman

2018

Social & Personality Psych

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Psychological momentum (PM) is thought to be a force that influences judgment, emotion, and performance. Based on a review of the extant literature, we elucidate two distinct approaches that researchers have adopted in their study of PM: the input‐centered approach and the output‐centered approach. Consistent with the input‐centered approach, we conceptualize PM as a process whereby temporal and contextual PM‐like stimuli (i.e., perceptual velocity, perceptual mass, perceptual historicity, and perceptually interconnected timescales)—initially perceived as an impetus—are extrapolated to imagined future outcomes through mental simulation. In turn, and consistent with the output‐centered approach, we posit that mental simulation elicits experiential (e.g., perceptual, cognitive, emotional) and behavioral states that govern goal pursuit, and that the pursuit of goals further influences perceptions of self, environment, and action quality. In all, we suggest that PM is interdependently linked to perceptions and behaviors in the sense that PM both influences and is influenced by changes in self‐perceptions, environmental perceptions, and behavior, and we conclude by linking the PM construct to recent work on prospection.

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The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking: New Evidence, New Challenges, New Insights

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Cited by 178 publications

References 273 publications

Comparisons inform me who I am: A general comparative processing model of self-perception

Comparisons inform me who I am: A general comparative processing model of self-perception

The Suppression of Inferences From Counterfactual Conditionals

Psychological momentum: The phenomenology of goal pursuit

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