The Four Worlds of ‘Welfare Reality’ – Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe

Abstract

After three decades of welfare state crisis, change and transformation can we still speak of welfare state regimes when looking at their outcomes? The analysis of outcomes provides a picture of ‘the real worlds of welfare’ and is of considerable importance to understanding political legitimacy across countries. We use aggregate longitudinal data for West European countries in order to map welfare outcomes and cluster countries. The cluster results are also assessed for their sensitivity to the choice of different countries, years or indicators. All European welfare states have a significant capacity for reducing poverty and inequality. However, the degree of this reduction varies considerably, especially when examining different social groups, i.e. unemployed people, children, youths or the elderly. Outcomes cluster countries largely in line with previous institutionalist literature, differentiating between conservative, liberal, Mediterranean and social-democratic regimes. As the main exception, we identify Germany, which can no longer be characterised as the proto-typical conservative welfare state. When analysing old social risks such as unemployment and old age, Europe appears to be characterised by two groups, i.e. one consisting of liberal and Mediterranean countries and a second made up of social-democratic and conservative countries. New social risks such as child and youth poverty, by contrast, replicate very closely the theoretical four-cluster typology. Our sensitivity analyses reveal that our clusters tend to be stable over time. Welfare regimes continue to serve as a useful analytical tool and relate to outcomes experienced by European citizens.

(De)familialization and (De)genderization – Competing or Complementary Perspectives in Comparative Policy Analysis?

“…Furthermore, the purely outcome-based approach, which focuses on comparing 'social realities', is also used (see e.g. Ferragina et al 2015; partially also Cho 2014).…”

The End of the Conservative German Welfare State Model

“…Obviously, socio‐economic outcomes can be caused by a number of factors; however, ‘non‐interventions’ are as relevant as policy interventions and politicians cannot be relieved from their responsibility through inaction (Luhmann : 79). According to Danforth's () longitudinal analysis of welfare regimes a split between liberal and conservative welfare states can only be identified if poverty measures are included in the analysis – highlighting the importance of outcome measures for regime analysis (also see Ferragina et al ). Outcome variables included in the analysis are: poverty and inequality measures; female employment; unemployment rate; long‐term unemployment; and low‐wage employment.…”

“…Inequality and poverty have increased significantly over the years in Germany; the Gini coefficient has increased to 0.28 and the poverty rate (less than 50 per cent of median income) has reached 9.6 per cent (an increase of more than 4 percentage points since 1981); using the now more common poverty threshold of households with less than 60 per cent of median income, the poverty rate increased from 10.6 to 16.4 per cent in 2010 (LIS ); poverty among the unemployed in 2012 stood at a staggering 69 per cent, the highest level in the EU (Ferragina et al . ), a result of ever fewer unemployed receiving an earnings‐related benefit. Also poverty (less than 60 per cent of median) among pensioners has increased significantly from 18 per cent in 2000 to 20 per cent in 2010 (LIS ).…”

Social adaptation and adaptation pressure among the “drifting elderly” in China: A qualitative study in Shanghai

“…8,9 In the West, the elderly have benefited from both national social welfare systems and traditionally independent family culture, so their decisions on whether to migrate are more voluntary and based on self-initiative and mainly depend on each individual's health and finances. 10 In contrast, for thousands of years, the Chinese elderly have supported their children and then been supported by them in return during their old age, and this is still currently the case. Therefore, their decisions on whether to migrate are more passive and dependent on others.…”