The Formal Verification of Safety-critical Assembly Code

O'Neill, Ian; Clutterbuck, D.L.; Farrow, P.F.; Summers, P.G.; Dolman, W. C.

doi:10.1016/s1474-6670(17)54540-1

Cited by 21 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Similarly, Clutterbuck and Carré performed formal verification of low-level code using SPACE-8080 [5], a verifiable subset of the Intel 8080 ISA that is analyzable and formally verifiable using the Southampton Program Analysis Development Environment (SPADE) [4]. Another usage of SPADE for verification of assembly was in the correctness proof of fuel control code for a Rolls-Royce jet engine [24].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification of Memory Preservation of x86-64 Binaries

Bockenek

Verbeek

Lammich

et al. 2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Formal verification of a binary can provide high software assurance, even when the source code is unavailable. It is, however, inherently hard due to the low level of abstraction involved; instead of verifying typed and structured source code, one has to verify machine code or reconstructed assembly. This paper presents a semi-automated methodology for formally verifying memory preservation, as well as register preservation, over disassembled binaries. The methodology is based on formal symbolic execution and Floyd-style verification. We show that the methodology is compositional on the function level, which is crucial for scalability. The methodology works for loops, recursion, and both optimized and non-optimized code. It can be used to expose preconditions required for non-exceptional behavior. We demonstrate applicability by verifying a set of functions from the HermitCore unikernel library.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Verification of Memory Preservation of x86-64 Binaries

Bockenek

Verbeek

Lammich

et al. 2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Nevertheless, the use of decompilation for verification has been suggested by Breuer and Bowen [6], and by Curzon [14] for verifying micro-code. The verification of low-level software [12,27] has also received a lot of attention. A number of approaches are based on either theorem proving, type checking, or static analysis.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Software model checking without source code

Chaki

Ivers

2010

Innovations Syst Softw Eng

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We present a framework, called AIR, for verifying safety properties of assembly language programs via software model checking. AIR extends the applicability of predicate abstraction and counterexample guided abstraction refinement to the automated verification of low-level software. By working at the assembly level, AIR allows verification of programs for which source code is unavailable-such as legacy and COTS software-and programs that use features-such as pointers, structures, and object-orientation-that are problematic for source-level software verification tools. In addition, AIR makes no assumptions about the underlying compiler technology. We have implemented a prototype of AIR and present encouraging results on several non-trivial examples.

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“…Any safety case will deploy three different kinds of argument in its support: Deterministic rule-based, logical arguments that are used to argue that some state of affairs is certainly true. The current Lucas Aerospace process rests to some extent on such elements [12]. Probabilistic arguments based on data drawn from testing, field experience etc.…”

Section: Safety Critical Avionics Softwarementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the current approach, project staff implement requirements by composition of highly verified microprocessor specific elements [3]. This is codified in the domain specific language LUCOL 2 [12].…”

Section: The Current Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…LUCOL elements are developed by specialists. The development of these elements is via a process which is mature, monitored by metrics which are used for feedback, and supported by highly developed verification processes, including formal verification [12]. That is, it satisfies many of the properties required to achieve the higher levels of the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) [17].…”

Section: The Current Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Secure synthesis of code: a process improvement experiment

Garbett

Parkes

Shackleton

et al. 1999

FM’99 — Formal Methods

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Arguments for and against the deployment of formal methods in system design are rarely supported by evidence derived from experiments that compare a particular formal approach with conventional methods [2]. We illustrate an approach to the use of formal methods for secure code synthesis in safety-critical Avionics applications. The technique makes use of code components and uses sound introduction rules for the components to ensure constraints on their use are enforced. The approach we describe is the subject of a controlled experiment where it is running in parallel with the conventional approach. We describe the experiment and report some preliminary findings.

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The Formal Verification of Safety-critical Assembly Code

Cited by 21 publications

References 2 publications

Formal Verification of Memory Preservation of x86-64 Binaries

Formal Verification of Memory Preservation of x86-64 Binaries

Software model checking without source code

Secure synthesis of code: a process improvement experiment

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